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1 Definition and nature of the maritime lien 
) The phrase 'maritime lien' appears in the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 
1983, as amended1 (to be referred to as the 'Act'), in three instances. The first is in 
:i 
I · paragraph (y) of the definition section2 which enumerates the maritime claims in respect of 
1 
l 
which the Supreme Court of South Africa i1 to exercise admiralty jurisdiction. One of the 
effects, therefore, of the existence of a maritime lien is to confer admiralty jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court. The second instance is in section 3(4)(a) which provides that a 
maritime claimant may enforce a claim by way of an action in rem if that claimant has a 
maritime lien over the property to be arrested, so that a further effect of the existence of a 
maritime is to furnish a maritime claimant with a form of remedy that claimant might not 
otherwise be able to invoke. Finally, the phrase appears ins 11(4)(e) which provides for 
the ranking of maritime creditors' claims against a limited fund. The maritime lien, 
therefore, confers a priority on the claimant against a limited fund formed by the proceeds 
of the sale of the property attached or arrested. This preference constitutes a form of 
security for the lienee. 
Despite these various references to the maritime lien, the Act does not define the concept, 
an undertaking acknowledged to be fraught with difficulties. Shaw3 has suggested that it, 
'is perhaps fortunate that the Legislature has refrained from attempting to deal with 
the intractable subject of the definition of a maritime lien'. 
But this reticence on the part of the Legislature has spawned difficulties of its own not the 
least of which have been the issues of which mar~.me claims are to be recognised as giving 
rise to maritime liens, and the nature and scope of those liens. 
By the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 1992. 
2 Section 1(1). 
3 Admiraltv Jurisdiction and Practice in South Africa at 86. 
t 
2 
In Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co Ltd v MV Fidias4 Nienaber J, as he then was, 
articulated the generally accepted view of the significance of the Legislature's failure to 
provide a definition of the phrase 'maritime lien', namely that, 
'[t]he Legislature, for some reason or another, deliberately chose not to define the 
term 'maritime lien'. That can only mean that the Legislature was content to le~ve 
it to the English law to fix the limits and the contents of this legal phenomenon.' 
The reason for the referral, as it were, to English law is to be found ins 6(1) of the Act 
which provides for the law to be applied by the courts in the exercise of their admiralty 
jurisdiction. The import of this provision has been explained by Marais J in Transol Bunker 
BV v MV Andrico Unity and Others: Grecian Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and Others in the 
following terms; 
' ... if the matter before me is one in respect of which a Court of admiralty of the 
Republic referred to in the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 of the United 
Kingdom had jurisdiction before the commencement of the Act on 1 November 
1983, I must apply the law which the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom 
in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction would have applied on 1 November 1983 
insofar as that law can be apphed.'6 
Claims based on maritime liens were part of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, 
before the enactment of the 1983 Act7, and therefore, in terms of s 6( 1) of the Act and 
according to the explanation of their import by Marais J, the approach8 of a South African 
court to a dispute involving maritime liens would be to ascettain what a notional court of 
the United Kingdom would determine English law to have been as at the relevant date, 






1986 (1) SA 714 (D). 
[bid at 7171-J. 
1987 (3) SA 794 (C) at 8011-J. 
Crooks & Co v Agriculcural Co-operative Union Ltd 1922 AD 423 at 441-2; Trivell & Co (Pty) Ltd and 
Others v Wm Brandt's Sons & Co Ltd and Others 1975 (3) SA 423 (A), and Beaver Marine (Pty) Ltd v 
Wuest 1978 (4) SA 263 (A) at 274. '· 
Adopted, inter alia, in the cases of Oriemal Commercial and Shipping Co Ltd v MV Fidias (op cit at 
718G-H); Transol Bunker BV I' MV Andrico Unity and Others: Grecian Mar SRL I' MV Andrico Unity 
and Others 1987 (3) SA 794 (C) at 8011-J and Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co and Others v MV Kalantiao 
1987 ( 4) SA 250 (D) at 253F-H, and approved by the Appellate Division in Transol Bunker BV v MV 




subject to the qualification that the provisions of s 6(1) would yield to any South African 
statute where the two were in conflict9. 
It is therefore, to English law, as it stood at 1 November 1983, that one must turn to 
discover the nature and scope of the 'creature' that is the maritime lien. Perhaps, the most 
appropriate point of departure in an investigation of the English law relating to maritime 
liens is the decision of Sir John Jervis in the case of Hanner v Bell, The Bold Bucc/eugh10 in 
which he adopted Lord Tenterden's definition of the maritime lien in Abbott's Law of 
Merchant Ships and Seamen11, which was fhat, 
' ... a maritime lien is well-defined ... to mean a claim or privilege upon a thing to be 
carried into effect by legal process .. .'. 
The learned judge continued; 
' ... that process to be a proceeding in rem ... This claim or privilege travels with the 
thing into whosoevers possession it may come. It is inchoate from "the moment the 
claim or privilege attaches, and, when carried into effect by legal process by a 
proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first attached.'12 
Ryan13 has argued that The Bold Buccleugh, though not the case where the concept of the 
maritime lien was 'born', was rather where it was 'unveiled and placed in full view'. Before 
that decision, so he contends, the courts had been aware that certain maritime causes 
produced concomitant rights or groups of rights in the litigants, but had, at least until The 
Bold Buccleugh, been unable to abstract from the case law a;iy controlling rationalisation 
for the recognition of those rights. Before 1851, so Ryan suggests, there had been a 
sculpturing process in progress and as each case or series of cases was decided, the rough 
outline of the maritime lien began to be perceived. This 'conceptual hiatus' in English law, 
Ryan submits, was finally bridged by the Privy Council in the Bold Bucc/eugh. 
9 This is the effect of the phrase in the section 'in so (er as it can be applied' when read together with s 
6(2) • see Staniland 'Should a Seaman Sue for his Wages as a Favoured Litigant?' 1986 Industrial Law 
fournal vol 7 part 3 451 at 452-3. 
10 (1850) 3 W Rob 220, a decision confirmed on appeal (1850-1) 7 Moo PC 267. 
11 14th ed (1901) at 1012. 
12 (1850-1) 7 Moo PC 2fJ7 at 284. 
13 'Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Maritime Lien: an historical perspective' (1968) 7 Western Ontario 




Hebert14, referring specifically to the description in The Bold Buccleugh15 of the maritime 
lien as a proprietary interest subject to the risks of ownership, has_ said_that, _________________________ _ 
'The Bold Buccleugh is the first enunciation of the principle that all maritime liens 
from whatever source arising are to be treated as a property interest in the vessel, 
and as such subject to all the risks of ownership.' 
Subsequently, Gorell Barnes J in The Ripon City16 described the maritime lien in the 
following terms; 
' ... alien is a privileged claim upon a vessel in respect of services done to it, or injury 
caused by it, to be carried into {iffect by legal process. It is a right acquired by one 
over a thing belonging to another - a ius in re aliena. It is, so to speak, a subtraction 
from the absolute property of the owner in the thing.' 
While there can be little doubt that the maritime lien does confer a proprietary interest in 
the encumbranced property, a warning must be sounded. That caution has been articulated 
by Diplock U in Banker's Trust International Limited v Todd Shipyard Corporation, The 
Halcyon Jsle17 where, referring in particular to the definition of Gorell Barnes Jin The 
Ripon City, he said, 
' ... the second sentence is inaccurate if it is to be regarded as suggesting that the 
owner of a ship, once it has become the subject of a maritime lien, can no longer 
create a char¥e on the whole property in the ship which will rank in priority to the 
existing lien.' 8 
Atkin U in The Tervaete defined a maritime lien as consisting, 
t 
' ... of the right by legal proceedings in an appropriate form to have the ship siezed by 
the officers of the court and made available by sale if not released on bail.'19 






'[t]his is a highly proceduralistic kind of definition and suffers from the defect that it 
fails to distinguish clearly a maritime lien and a statutory right of action in rem:20 
'The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens' (1930) 4 Tulane Law Review 381 at 406, 
Hanner v Bell, T71e Bold Buccleugh (1850-1) 7 Moo~C 267 at 285, 
[1897] P 226 at 242. 
[1980] 3 AUER 197 (PC) at 202f-g. 
See too, in this regard, Marais J's comments in Tra11sol Bu11ker BV 1• MV A11drico U11ity a11d O"rs: -
Grecia11 Mar SRL v MV A11drico Unity a11d Others 1987 (3) SA 794 (C) at 821C-D. 
[1922] P 259 at 273. 
Maritime Liens Yol 14 British Shipping Laws (1980) at 10 footnote 59. 
5 
This must be considered a serious defect in the definition because the distinction is of some 
_ .. __ _ _ ~~n~ider3:~l~_.i111e_ortanc~ give~ the· _differing nature and coT1sequence_s gf each2\ .... 
Scott Ll in The Tolten22, in drawing a comparison between the English notion of a 
maritime lien and its Continental counterpart, generally referred to as a 'privilege', said, 
'[t]he essence of the "privilege" was and still is, whether in Continental or English 
law, that it comes into existence automatically without any antecedent formality, and 
simultaneously with the cause of action, and confers a true charge on the ship and 
freight of a proprietary kind in favour of the privileged creditor. The charge goes 
with the ship everywhere, even in the hands of a purchaser for value without notice, 
and has cer~in ranking with other ~aritime liens, all of which take precedence over 
mortgages.' 
These attributes identify and characterise the maritime lien. 
Some tentative attempts at a definition of the concept have been essayed by the South 
African courts. Nienaber J, in MV Fidias24 approved the description of Howard J, as he 
then was, in Gulf Oil Trading Co and Others v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale 
of the MV Emerald Transporter; Irving Trust Co v Gulf Trading Co and Others; Gulf Trading 
Co and Others v The Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of the MV Jade Transporter25: 
'Without attempting to define the concept, I think it is trite to say that a maritime 
lien is a charge in the nature of a ius in re aliena which encumbers the ship against or 
in respect of which the claim lies.'26 
Of this description, and, perhaps, some of the others referre,d to, the following remarks by 
Marais J in The Andrico Unity27 may be apposite: 
'The metaphorical and sometimes exaggerated language which is occasionally used 
by Judges to highlight the special characteristics of a maritime lien should not be 
taken too literally and should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is not in truth 
a ius in re aliena, nor is it a subtraction from the absolute property of the owner in 
the ship. It is a concept sui generis and its reason for existence is to improve the 
21 See generally Thomas op cit at 31-2; Price 'Maritime Liens' (1941) LOR 409 at 414-5, and Dillon & 
Van Niekerk Maritime Law and Marine lnsurance:~elected Topics Chapter 1 at 14. 
22 [1946) P 135. . 
23 Ibid at 150. 
24 Op cit at 7151. 
25 1985 ( 4) SA 133 (N). 
26 Ibid at 142B-C. 
27 Transol Bunker BVv MV Andrico Unity and Others: Grecian Mar SRL v MV Andn·co Uniry and Others 
1987 (3) SA 794 (C). 
6 
holder's prospect of his claim being paid. It is therefore designed toi.§ecure payment 
and to confer some priority when there is competition for payment.' 
In the case of Euromarine International ofMauien V The ShipBerg and0thers29,Milne 1P,--
as he then was, referred to the definition proferred by the American authors Gilmore and 
Black30: 
'The learned authors define a maritime lien as follows: "Upon the occurrence of 
certain mishaps or the non-fulfilment of certain obligations arisin~ out of contract or 
status, the maritime law gives to the party aggrieved a right conceived of as a 
property interest in a tangible thing involved (usually but not always a ship), in the 
( often as yet unf:scertained) amount of the accrued liability. This right is called a 
maritime lien".' 1 
\ 
But again, of this definition it may be said that the suggestion that the maritime ,lien is a 
property interest or right is open to exception if it is taken to suggest a right of ownership 
which might be exercised without the aid of a court of law. The holder of a maritime lien 
certainly does not acquire a right in the vessel32 in that sense. 
Perhaps, towards the close of any quest to define the concept, all that can be said is that the 
maritime lien is 'more easily recognised than defined'33. But while it may be that there is 
no one entirely satisfactory definition that has been widely accepted, the attributes of a 
maritime lien, as gleaned from these and various other judicial pronouncements, are 
relatively well settled34. 
The maritime lien gives the lienee a charge on a maritime r;s, That charge accrues from 
the moment the circumstances out of which the lien arises occur. The charge travels 
secretly - 'like a mollusc to the hull of a ship'35 - and unconditionally with the res even into 









Ibid at 821D-F. 
1984 (4) SA 647 (N). 
The Law of Admiraltv 2nd ed at 36. 
Op cir at 652G-H. 
Mansfield 'Maritime Lien' (1888) LOR 379 at 381. 
Sheen J in nic Father 77iames [1979) 2 Lloyd's Rep 364 at 368. 
For a comprehensive description of these attributes sec the judgment of Marais J in the case of Tra11sol 
Bu11ker BV v MV A11drico U11ity a11d OLhers: Grecia11 Mar SRL v .MVAndn·co Unity a11d Others 1987 (3) 
SA 794 (C) at 811F-G, 819A, 821D. 
Staniland 'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 SAU 293. 
- ----·----·- .. 
' 
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an action in rem in which a maritime res, encumbranced bv a maritime lien, is arrested and . . 
thereafter, may be sold. The claim which is underpinned by the maritime lien is then 
satisfied out of the proceeds of that sale. The claim enjoying maritime lien status is 
privileged in that it enjoys a relatively high priority, which, in South African admiralty law, 
is assigned by the Act36, among the claims against any limited fund for the satisfaction of 
creditors' claims. 
Although it has been said that maritime liens are available against 'maritime property', that 
statement is misleading to the extent that it may suggest that all maritime liens are 
available against any and all maritime property. Precisely what property may be burdened, 
as it were, by any particular maritime lien is a matter to be determined in relation to each 
of the maritime liens recognised37. 
The unique nature of the maritime lien is thrown into stark relief when it is ·compared with 
a concept to which, from its name, it might be considered to be related or, at least, bear 
some resemblance, namely the liens, or perhaps more accurately named rights of retention, 
recognised at common law. From the description of the features of a maritime lien, it must 
be evident that it differs fundamentally from the common law conception of a lien, to the 
extent that Gilmore and Black38 felt constrained to comment that, '[a] maritime lien so-
called, is not a lien at all in the common law sense of the ter111'. 
(>, 
Sonie of the more striking differences may serve the purpose of this comparison. The term 
'lien' is generally understood to describe the right to retain physical control of another's 
property, as a means of securing payment of a claim relating to the expenditure of money 
or money's worth by the possession of that property until the claim is satisfied39. A lien is a 
very limited right of security over goods. It remains good, in the sense of being effective 
both against the property owner and third partie~asserting rights in respect of those goods, 
36 Section 11. 
37 See the discussion on this aspect in relation lo each of the maritime liens. 
38 Op cit at 586. 
39 Brooklyn House Fumishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 (3) SA 264 (A) at 270E; United Building 
Society v Smookler's Trustees and Golombik's Trustee 1906 TS 623 at 626-7. 
only so long as the lienee does not part with possession of the goods, that possession being 
the equivalent of notice, certainly to third parties, of the interest held by the lienee in the 
encumbered property. The lien is lost when the lienee deals with the goods in any way 
1 inconsistent with its continuance40. 
By contrast the maritime lien is not in any way dependent for its existence or its efficacy 
against third parties, on possession of the encumbered goods or, for that matter, notice of 
the encumbrance it constitutes. That is, perhaps, one of its more valuable attributes but 
also one that holds the potential for the greatest hardship, especially in the hands of third 
parties who may, for example, find themselves confronted by claimants seeking to enforce 
rights against the property the third party has acquired without any notice of the existence 
of such rights. 
Furthermore, common law liens afford merely a defence against the property owner's 
vindicatory action and never a cause of action41. This too, differs fundamentally from the 
maritime lien which constitutes a maritime claim in itself and would therefore be the basis 
of any remedy to enforce that claim42. 
Priority among competing common law liens is in general determined by the time at which 
they attached or became perfected: the general principle being qui prior est tempore potior 
t 
est iure. Priority among competing maritime liens is, in principle, not determined in that 
way though it is by no means a simple task to formulate a general guiding principle that 
holds for all instances in this regard. 
40 Orbit Motors (Pty) Ltd v Reeds (Cape) Limited 1975 (2) SA 333 (C). 
41 Brook~vn House Fumishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons (op cit at 270F). 
42 Section l(l)(v). 
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Furthermore, common law liens are accessory rights to a principal obligation, inseparable 
from that obligation in the sense that they are incapable of being assigned_4~. !hey a_re 
founded on the personal liability of the owner of the property that is the subject of the lien. 
·-•~ By comparison, this is not true of all maritime liens44. 
-~ The consequences of classifying a claim as giving rise to a maritime lien have already been 
-~ 
adverted to briefly. More specifically though, the more important consequences must be 
considered to be that the existence of a maritime lien provides a claimant with the form of 
remedy known as the action in rem45. This'enables the maritime litigant to arrest the 
encumbered vessel and conduct proceedings for relief against that vessel without the 
necessity of locating the owner of the property. This remedial aspect of the right is of 
considerable value in the field of maritime law where the identity and location of the owner 
may be extremely difficult to ascertain and the opportunities for enforcing t~e claim rare 
and of extremely short duration. Furthermore, the existence of the lien has procedural 
consequences in that it secures a preference for the lien holder in the ranking of claims 
against a limited fund for the satisfaction of the debts of the property; and that preference 
affords the maritime claimant a measure of security for the claim46. 
While the general effects of the maritime lien then are relatively clear, the difficulties of 
determining which claims give rise to maritime liens in Sout,ti African admiralty law and, 
furthermore, in defining the precise nature and scope of these liens remain. These 
difficulties arise partly because of the reticence of the Legislature on this aspect47 but also 
partly because of the all-encompassing nature of s 6(1) which it has been argued48 
imported indiscriminately, even perhaps unwittingly, all the English law relating to 







Joubert (ed) LA WSA Vol 15 at 86. 
See the discussion on this aspect in relation to each of the maritime liens. 
Section 3(4)(a) of the Act. 
Section 11 of the Act. 
Supra at 2. 
Staniland 'The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act and the Maritime Claim of a Saudi Arabian 
Necessaries Man' (1986) 103 SAU 350 at 354. 
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include whether there is a closed list or numerus clausus of maritime liens in that legal 
~ ... _____ .. __ S)'.S~~~;·-~~~~~( the maritime lien is _a substantive_ or procedural_ right, and whether 
personal liability of the owner is required for the existence of the maritime lien. 
The first problem then is to determine what maritime liens are recognised in contemporary 
1 South African admiralty law and, the second, the precise nature and scope of these liens . . 
'·? ,, 
And for a solution to this problem, for the reasons already outlined, one must turn to 
English admiralty law. By the mid-nineteenth century the claims giving rise to maritime 
liens were relatively well established49. The 1840 Admiralty Act50, however, extended the 
court's jurisdiction in respect of certain of the claims traditionally recognised as giving rise 
to maritime liens. This was done for the purpose of enlarging the court's jurisdiction but it 
did raise the question of whether the liens arising from those claims were in each case 
1 extended commensurately. 
t 
J This issue was dealt with by the English courts on the basis that where the statutory 
enactment enlarged, territorially or substantively, the ambit of a claim which was an 
established maritime lien then the presumption of statutory construction in respect of that 
1 proyision was that the Legislature intended the maritime lien to be extended to the same 
degree, and where the enactment extended the court's jurisdiction by creating a claim that 
7 
l was not originally a maritime lien, the presumption was against the creation of a new 
~ 
maritime lien51. 
By time of the passing of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act in 1890, the Act which fixed 
' the limits of admiralty juriscjiction in the colonies and which was to fix that jurisdiction in 
South Africa until the enactment of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act in 1983, the 
law relating to maritime liens in England was relatively_ well-settled. It was that body of law 
' that was applied in South Africa until the passing of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation 
Act in 1983 which, inter alia, abolished the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act. It may have 
49 Thomas op cit at 30 and the authorities cited therein. 
50 Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Viet c 65). 
51 771e Mary Anne (1865) LR 1 A & E 8; 771e Sara (1889) 14 App Cas 209; 771c Castlegate [1893) AC 38. 
-- _ 11 
been through a fear of losing, particularly the body of law relating to maritime liens, that, in 
. order to preserve it, s 6 of the Act was worded in the convoluted way it was. 
What then are the established contemporary liens in South African admiralty law? And 
furthermore what is the scope of each of the maritime liens and the requirements for their 
existence? 
The argument advanced by counsel in Oriental Shipping Co Ltd v MV ,f_idias was that the 
claims listed in, what was before the 199~ amendment, s 1 l(l)(c) of the Act, by virtue of 
\ 
the fact that they were listed alongside each other and some cle~rly gave rise to maritime 
liens, all constituted claims which gave rise to maritime liens. It must have been the 
intention of the Legislature, so it was argued, that all the cl~ims ins ll(l)(c)_!!IS!refore 
• conferred maritime liens on the clai~ants. From this it followed, according to counsel in 
that case, that the claim ins ll(l)(c)(v) for the supply of goods or rendering of services, 
which was the claim in that case, conferred a maritime lien on such claimant52. 
~ienaber J53, however, rejected the argument on the basis that s 11 did not purport to be a 
definition clause but concerned itself merely with the ranking of claims. It therefore could 
not be used to determine the existence of maritime liens. The learned judge held 
accordingly that not all the claims in that section gave rise to maritime liens. He had, 
earlier in the judgment, stated that, 
'[a] maritime lien is a secured maritime claim which originates in a particular 
manner. English law at present recognises a numerus clausus of maritime liens, 
restricted to debts incurred in respect of or occasioned by the vessel and which may 
arise, to e~ploy South African legal terminology, ex contractu (such as seaman's and 
master's wages), ex delicto (collision damage) or f!f'asi ex contractu (for instance 
master's disbursements and claims for salvage ).'5 
52 Op cit at 717F-G. 
53 Ibid at 7171-718F. 
54 Ibid at 715F-G. 
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The view that seems widely held among South African courts55, is that English law 
recognised only a limited number of claims as giving rise to maritime liens. The views in 
England on this point are not unanimous. There are disssenters such as Griffith Price56 
who contend that, 
'[i]n this country maritime liens arise where the claims are for bottomry, damage by 
collision, salvage, seamen's and masters' wages, and masters' disbursements. These 
are the only "genuine" maritime liens in our law_dmt in a few cases liens arise 
indirectly out of the provisions of some statute.' 
. Thomas58, somewhat more equivocally, says that, 
\ 
'[u]nder English maritime law maritime liens arise in respect of damage done by a 
ship, salvage, seamen's and masters' wages, masters' disbursements and bottomry. 
These represent the "principal" or "genuine" maritime liens although others may 
arise by implication from statutory enactments.' 
The view of the South African courts that English law recognises only a closed list of liens 
has been criticised by Staniland59 who argues that, 
'[a]lthough Nienaber J said that English law recognises a numerus cjgusus.Qf 
maritime liens, it would with respect be more accurate to speak of~~and 
@sertain'1.1sts of maritime liens. It is established that maritime liens attacfi to 
claimsforsalvage, damage done by a ship, seaman's wages, master's wages, master's 
disbursements, and bottomry and respon.dentia bonds. But it is uncertain in English 
law whether maritime liens attach to claims for fees and ex2enses by the receiver of 
wreck (s 567( .. 2) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 ); rem,uner.aiimffor_coas.tg.uaro-
se~~s .inresp~.£t g_f y.,rec}( (s 568(1) of the ~_er_chant Shipping Act 1~94 ); damage 
done to lands in the rendering of assistance to shipwrecked persons or property (s 
513 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 ); pilotage (The Ambatielos and The 
Ceplzalonia [1923] P 68); damage done by ships to harpours, piers and docks (s 74 of 
the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act 1847; Tfi'e Merle (1874) 31 LT 447) and 
finally towage (Westrup v Great Yannoutlz Steam Carrying Company (1889) 43 ChD 
241).' 
55 - .See for example the cases of Oriemal Commercial and Shipping Co Ltd 1• .MV Fidias (op cir at 715F-G); 
Sou/hem S/eamship Agency Inc and Ano/her v MV Khalij Sky 1986 (1) SA 485 (C) at 4911; Transol 
Bunker BV1· AfVAndrico Unity and O//zers: Grecian Mar SRL \' MV Andrico Unify and Others 1987 (3) 
SA 794 (C) at 805.l-806A, and Transo/ Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unit,• and O1hers: Grecian Mar SRL v 
MV Andrico Unity and Others 1989 (4) SA 325 (A) ~-331G-H, thoug·h admiuedly thi, was not 
necessary for deciding the disputes before the courts on these occasions. 
56 'Maritime Liens' (1941) Vol L VII LOR 409. 
57 Ibid at 409. 
58 Op cit at 5. 
59 'The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act and the Maritime Claim of a Saudi Arabian Necessaries 
Man' (1986) 103 SALi 350 at 355. 
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Staniland60 has argued that rather than a numerus clausus of liens there are 'established' 
"------------a~~ '1.1-~~~~~ain' lie11_~:_ _!f_epoint~_to _authorities in South African case_I~~_that_h<1y~jT1tjif3:ted ______________ _ 
a limited number of liens such as the MV Fidias61 and says that for the purposes of what 
those courts had to decide in the matters before them, the statements were sufficient but as 
general statements about South African law relating to maritime liens they are insufficient 
and even misleading62. 
Hofmeyr63 refers to liens arising by implication from the provisions of the English 
Merchant Shipping Acts of 1854 and 1894 as being those for life salvage64; fees and 
expenses of the receiver of wrecks65, and damage sustained by the owner or occupier of 
land used to facilitate the rendering of assistance to wreck66. 
Despite this criticism by Staniland of the notion there that there is such a closed list of 
maritime liens and the acceptance by Hofmeyr of additional liens arising by implication, 
the position in South African law remains unclear because the issue has not yet arisen for 
consideration by our courts. It certainly seems, from the decisions referred, to that South 
African admiralty law, at least implicitly, recognises only the limited categories of lien 
recognised under English admiralty law. 
60 'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 SAU 293. 
61 Op cit at 715F-G. 
62 See the discussion infra at 48 relating to the 'uncertain' maritime liens in English law. 
63 'Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa' 1982Acta 114[jdica 30 at 40. 
64 Section 55 of the Merchant Shipping Act which re-enacted ss 458 and 459 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act of 1854 as extended by s 9 oft.he Admiralty Court Act of 1861. 
65 Section 567 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 which re-enacted s 455 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
of 1854 and provided that the receiver sho/Jd, in respect of his fees and expenses, have the same rights 
and remedies as a salvor. ,~ 
66 Section 513 of the Merchant Shipping A~t of 1854 provided that such damage should be a charge on 
the maritime res and would be recovernble in the same manner as salvage. 
I 
·:i 
2 The scope of the 'established' modern South African Admiralty maritime liens and 
the necessity for personal liability of the asset owner 
The distinction drawn by Staniland1 between 'established' and 'uncertain' liens offers a 
convenient entry point into the subject of the contemporary maritime lien in South African 
admiralty law. The classes of 'established' liens would include those for bottomry and 
respondentia bonds; damage; salvage; seamen's wages, and master's wages and 




suggested3 might arise by implication from'certain of the United Kingdom statutes, and so-
called 'foreign' maritime liens by which is meant maritime liens recognised by foreign 
jurisdictions, but not by South African courts. It is then to the 'established' liens that we 
first turn. 
2.1 The damage maritime lien 
In South African admiralty law the Act confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction in respect of 'any claim for, arising out of or relating to 
... any damage caused by or to a ship, whether by collision or otherwise'4. The admiralty 
jurisdiction over damage claims existed before the enactment of the 1983 Act5, and 
therefore in terms of s 6(1) of the Act, English admiralty law as at 1 November 1983, being 
t 
the date of commencement of the South African Act, is app1icable. To determine whether 
and, if so, to what extent, a claimant for relief for collision damage enjoys a maritime lien, 
the South African Courts must apply the law which the High Court of Justice in the United 






'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 SAU 293. 
Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co Ltd v MV Fidias 1986 (1) SA 714 (D) at 715F-H. 
Supra at 12-3. 
Section l(l)(e). 





The question of whether collision damage gave rise to a maritime lien in English law was 
settled in Harmer v Bel~ The Bold Buccleugh6, a decision which was subsequently approved 
i~ Currie v M'Knight1. 
Before the passing of the 1840 Act8, the jurisdiction of the court in respect of the damage 
maritime claim and the scope of the maritime lien associated with that claim had been 
restricted to damage 'on the high seas'. But the 1840 Act saw the court's jurisdiction 
extended to incorporate those instances in which the damage had been received while the 
ship or vessel was either within the 'body of a county', or 'upon the high seas'9. 
This extension of jurisdiction raised the question as to whether the lien previously 
recognised had likewise been extended. The issue was resolved by the adoption of a canon 
of statutory construction that presumed that where the statute extended the geographical 
jurisdiction in respect of a claim which was an established maritime lien, then the 
Legislature intended to extend the maritime lien as well10. 
Section 6 of the 1840 was narrowly construed to exclude damage done by a ship, a lacuna 
that was filled by s 7 of the 1861 Act which made provision for a claim for such damage. 







(1850) 3 W Rob 220 at 229, a decision confirmed on appeal (1850-1) 7 Moo PC 267 by the Privy 
Council. 
(1897] AC 97 at 106. '· 
Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Viet c 65). 
Section 6: 'The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction to decide all claims and demands 
whatsoever in the nature of ... damage received by any ship or sea-going vessel, ... and to enforce 
payment thereof, whether such ship or vessel may have been within the body of a county, or upon the 
high seas, at the time when the ... damage [was] received, ... in respect of which such claim is made.' 
The Sara (1889) 14 AC 209 at 216. 
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Before the passing of the 1861 Act11 there had been a tendency to restrict damage claims 
to those resulti_ng_fr~m t_he direct phys~cal c_ontact of t~e vessel_12 but the 18~1 Act13 which 
conferred a claim for any damage 'done by a ship' caused this issue to fall away: it was clear 
from the statutory provision that what was envisaged was damage caused by a ship even if 
there had not been physical contact with the damaged property14. Despite the apparently 
restrictive wording, the phrase has been construed as incorporating claims 'arising out of 
damage received so that it includes consequential loss15. The damage need not be caused 
by another ship but where the damage is so caused considerable overlap exists with the 
\ . 
claim for 'damage done by' a ship. 
In the South African Act of 1983 the two claims were differentiated. Ins l(l)(d) the claim 
was for 'damage caused by a ship, whether by collision or otherwise' and in paragraph (e) it 
was 'for damage done to a ship, whether by collision or otherwise'. As far as the change in 
wording from the English 'damage done by' to the South African 'damage caused by' is 
concerned there would appear to be no difference for the purpose of determining 
jurisdiction. The English term 'done by' is a term of art familiar to English law and has 
been widely construed16. 
The 1992 amendment to the South African Act17 combines the formerly separate claims 
and the relevant paragraph now reads 'damage caused by or,.to a ship, whether by collision 
or otherwise'18. This wording is drawn from the corresponding provision in the Convention 
Relating to the Arrest of Sea-going Ships, 195219, which Thomas20, points out reflects the 
'broad -contemporary construction given to the more succinct phrase in English law'; Given 
11 Admiralty Court Act 1861 (24 & 25 Viet c 10). 
12 77ic Robcn Pow (1863) B & L 99 quoted in Thomas op cit at 105. 
13 Section 7 
'The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdictiol,j,. over any claim for damage done by any ship.' 
14 This interpretation \Vas accepted by Lord Herschdl in Cunic v M'Knight (op cit at 108). 
15 771c Eschcrshcim [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 (HL) at 9. · 
16 Thomas op cit at 105 and the authorities cited therein. 
17 Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 1992. 
18 Section l(l)(c). 
19 The provision reads, 'damage caused by any ship either in collision or otherwise'. 
20 Op cit at 105. 
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that there would appear to be no difference in the wording for the purposes of determining 
jurisdiction, it would appear safe to assume that there would also be no difference for the 
--·--- -·----·· ---· ·--··---------- -- ---------- ··-- -
' purpose of determining the extent of the lien. 
The developed admiralty damage jurisdiction of English law is far more comprehensive 
than the ambit of the damage maritime lien. The lien is only available where the damage 
can be shown to have been 'done by a ship'21. In relation to damage claims therefore there 
is no exact concurrence between the scope of the admiralty jurisdiction and the availability 
of the lien. \ 
It was a pre-requisite for the existence of the maritime lien that the ship had to have been 
the 'instrument of mischief22. That was the interpretation placed on s 7 of the 1861 
Admiralty Act. In other words, it had to be shown that the damage complained of had 
been actively caused by the ship herself. That interpretation would exclude-from 'damage 
done by a ship', for example, negligent mismanagement of the ship and also damage done 
by the personnel on board a ship, independently of the instrumentality of the ship herself. 
In the case of Currie v M'Knight, crew members cut loose moorings attaching their ship to 
an adjacent ship causing that ship to drift and incur damaged. It was held that the cause of 
the damage was the conduct of the crew in cutting the moorings and the ship itself could 
not be said to have been the instrument of the damage. 
In the words of Lord Halsbury LC: 
' ... the phrase that it must be the fault of the ship itself is not a figurative expression, 
but it imports, in my opinion, that the ship against which a maritime lien for 
damages is claimed is the instrument of mischief and that in order to establish the 
liability of the ship itself to the maritime lien claimed some act of navigation of the 
ship itself should either mediately or immediately be the cause of the damage.'23 
.... 
21 Ibid at 131. 
22 Currie 1• M'K11ight (op cit at 107). 
23 Ibid at 101. 
i r-------
Lord Watson delivering a separate judgment in the same case said: 
. ___ J th_ink itjsof the ess~nce of the rule that_the_ damage in respect of which a 
maritime lien is admitted must be either the direct result or the natural consequence 
of a wrongful act or manoeuvre of the ship to which it attaches. Such an act or 
manoeuvre is necessarily due to the want of skill or negligence of the persons by 
whom the vessel is navi~ated, but it is, in the language of maritime law, attributed to 
the ship, because the ship in their negligent or unskillful hands is the instrument 
which causes the damage.'24 
It is not sufficient to show merely that the ship was the active means by which the damage 
was inflicted. It has to be established that those in control of the vessel are in breach of a 
' duty. The maritime lien is based on fault. The damage complained of has to be shown to 
be the direct or consequential result of a breach of duty on the part of a person in lawful 
charge or control of the wrongdoing ship25. 
Whereas it is clearly established that a maritime lien for damage is founded on fault there 
has existed less certainty about the associated question of whether the fault must be 
attributable, either directly or vicariously, to the owner of the ship at the time when the 
cause of action arose. The view that has prevailed in English law is that the personal 
liability of the owner is a condition precedent to the accrual of a damage lien26. 
The rather obvious implication of this principle is that where the damage is done by a ship 
when in the possession and control of an independent contractor, or some other person or 
~f 
undertaking, to whom possession and control have been lawfully transferred, no damage 
maritime lien arises. But there is a distinction to be drawn between an independent 
contractor and an employee for whose negligent actions the ship-owner will be held 
vicariously liable. On that basis the ship-owner would be, for example, vicariously liable for 
the negligent acts of a pilot voluntarily engaged but generally not for the acts of a pilot 
..... 
24 Ibid at 106-7. 
25 171c Toltcn [1946) P 135 at 146; 77ic Tervactc [1922) P 259 at 270; 77ic Eschcrshcim [1976) 2 Lloyd's 
Reports 1 (HL). 
26 17,e Dmid (1842) 1 W .Rob 391 appears to be the earliest authority where concurrence between the 
liability of a ship and the personal liability of the ship-owner was categorically stated and it was 
followed in 771e Parlemelll Beige (1880) 5 PD 197. 
whom the ship-owner is compelled to engaged which would be the, case in South African 
ports27. 
An exception to the requirement of personal liability on the part of the ship-owner seems 
to exist in the case of charter-parties by demise28. In respect of damage caused by a breach 
of a duty on the part of a master of a demised ship, it is the demise charterer who is 
vicariously liable and not the ship-owner because the master in such circumstances is the 
employee of the demise charterer. Yet it seems that in such instances a lien does arise in 
respect of the ship concerned though the jlldicial reasoning for so holding seems to vary29. 
The correctness of this view depends, of course, on the view taken about the nature of the 
position of the charterer by demise; in other words, whether one considers that the demise 
charterer becomes the temporary owner. 
The damage envisaged clearly encompasses direct damage to property but there is less 
certainty as to whether the lien would extend to damages for personal injury and or loss of 
life resulting from a collision. In South Africa, the Merchant Shipping Act30 provided that 
claims for damage relating to collisions should be' ... deemed to include damage for loss of 
life'. Although this section has been repealed, section l(l)(t) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Regulation Act provides for jurisdiction in respect of 'any claim for loss of life or personal 
injury caused by a ship or any defect in a ship, or occurring i~ connection with the .. 
employment of a ship; .. .'. From this it is clear that the jurisdiction of the court extends to 
loss of life or personal injury but this concerns only the question of jurisdiction and not 
whether there is a maritime lien in respect of such a claim. 
With no clear indication in the South African legislation in this regard it is necessary to 
have recourse to English law. The question of whether personal injury caused by negligent 
27 Bamford The Law of Shipping and Carriage in Sou"ib Africa at 67; J T Rennie & Sons v Minis/er of 
Railways & Harbours 1913 NPD 396 at 415. 
28 In broad terms a charter-party is a contract for the hire of a ship in terms of which possession and 
control is transferred to the charterer, and the master and crew are engaged by the charterer and are 
not the servants of the ship-owner (Sandeman v Seu" (1866) LR 2 QB 86). 
29 Thomas op cit at 129 and the authorities cited therein. 
30 Act 57 of 1951, s 322. 
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navigation of a ship created a maritime lien has not been expressly decided by the English 
courts. The view prevailed that such claims did not enjoy maritime lien status and this was 
----------· ·---~-. __ , ___ ·- -- . ... - ... ·-·-· ... -·· ----- -- --- ... ----------. -·------------
based on the view that s 7 of the 1861 Act did not confer such jurisdiction in respect of such 
claims on the courts. In terms of the section neither personal injury nor loss of life arising 
from a collision involving a ship were expressly stated to give rise to a maritime claim. The 
section was interpreted initially to exclude a claim for either injury or loss of life. It was, 
however, inevitable that once the judicial mood was set to construe the statute's wording 
according to its ordinary and grammatical meaning, it would be interpreted as covering 
\ 
both damage to property and personal injury31. 
Staniland32 suggests that the Admiralty court had inherent jurisdiction to determine claims 
for personal injury and, if he is correct in that contention, he would argue that ss 7 and 35 
of the 186i°Act extended the traditional maritime lien for damage done by ships to include 
claims for personal injury as simply a further consequential loss. 
Thomas' view33 is that it is without question in English Law that a maritime lien does now 
exist for a claim for damages for personal injury. He refers to The Tolten34 as authority. In 
this case it appeared to be accepted, albeit obiter, that there existed a maritime lien in 
respect of claims for personal injury. 
f 
The position in South African law is determined by the view~ one holds of that in English 
law. If a maritime lien exists for personal injury in English law then by virtue of the 
provisions of s 6( 1) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, such maritime lien exists 
in our law. It would be difficult to defend preferential treatment of a claim for damage to 
property over that of a claim for personal injury, and strong policy considerations would 
militate in favour of dealing with such claims on an equal footing at least. 
.... 
31 771e Sylph (1867) LR 2 A & E 24. 
32 'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 SAU 293 at 302-4. 
33 Op cit at 132. 
34 11946) P 135 (CA) at 147. 
35 Ibid at 302-4. 
35a Legal. Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 (1) SA 608 (A). 
36 Ibid at 304. 
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Staniland35 considers that the since the lien is commensurate with the jurisdiction under 
English admiralty law, there is significance to be attached to the fact that the jurisdiction of 
- -----·------···------------ -----,.----·- --------·~---------- - - . -···--------- - ·-- .. - . ----- ··-------· «-··------·· - ·--- ---- ····--·----·· ----------- - ·-· -------·----- -----------
the South African court is apparently wider than that of the English courts,_ namely, 'injury 
occurring in connection with the employment of the ship'. He would argue that such 
extension of the court's jurisdiction is indicative of a Legislative intent to extend the 
traditional maritime lien accordingly. 
As regards the claim for loss of life, Staniland argues that no action in rem existed in 
English law for such dependant's actions. Presently the claim for loss of life is established 
in English law statutorily under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. It seems generally accepted 
that there is no maritime lien in such case but only a statutory right of action in rem. Since 
the courts had no jurisdiction to determine such claims before the enactment of the 1983 
Act, Roman-Dutch law, and not English law would be applicable. Under t~e Lex Aquilia, 
where a party wrongfully causes the death of a person who owes a duty of support to 
another, that wronged dependant is entitled to compensation for pecuniary loss suffered in 
consequence of the breadwinner's death35a. Staniland36 contends that it is arguable that 
the broad terms in which the maritime claim ins l(l)(f) for loss of life or injury is couched 
could be construed as extending the maritime lien under s l(l)(e) to claims for loss oflife. 
The argument, such as it is, is bolstered by policy considerations in favour of treating such 
~1 
claims in the same way as claims for personal injury and damage to property. 
There is, furthermore, uncertainty as to whether the damage maritime lien would extend to 
pollution ciamage resulting from a collision at sea. Whether this is so depends, in the first 
instance, on whether the ship-owner is considered to be responsible for both direct and 
consequential damage arising out of the accident, and, in the second instance, if the ship-
owner is to be considered to be responsible for CQpsequential damages, whether pollution 
constitutes such consequential damage. 
35 Ibid at 302-4. 
35a Legal, Insurance Co Ltd v Botes 1963 (1) SA 608 (A). 
36 Ibid at 304. 
Pollution damage is regulated in South African law by a mass of unconnected statutes 
relating to marine pollution37. But Staniland has argued that no maritime lien has been 
·-·--··-· ····-·-··-·-·--- . -- . --- --
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created by implication under any of this legislation. Staniland does, however, suggest that 
if one were to regard the maritime lien in respect of damage as covering consequential 
damage, pollution would fall within the ambit of that lien and, of course, the advantage of 
that view would be that it would serve the policy goal of environmental protection38. 
At English law it seems that the maritime lien extends to consequential damage. Tetley39 
argues that the maritime lien for damage d6ne by a ship does encompass both direct and 
consequential damages and on that basis would consider that liability which a damage ship 
would incur due to resulting pollution would be covered by the traditional maritime lien. 
Other authors40, however, are silent on whether the traditional lien extends to pollution 
damage. 
In English law there appears to be a maritime lien for consequential damage but the 
question remains as to whether pollution is to be considered consequential damage. In the 
case of The Eschersheim41 , Brandon J held that pollution could be a loss consequential on 
damage done by a ship, and though the case went on appeal42 the learned Judge was not 
overruled on this point. It would seem probable that a maritime lien attaches to a claim for 
liability for pollution, at least, in so far as the pollution dam~e is consequential on damage 
done by a ship. Certainly where the damage is direct, for example where the vessel 
negligently discharges cargo or fuel that causes pollution, there would appear to be no 
reason in principle why there should be no maritime lien, provided patrimonial loss is 
suffered. 
37 For an overview of the relevant legislation see Rabi~ & Lusher 'South African Marine Pollution 
Control Legislation' 1986 Acta Juridica 161. · 
38 Staniland 'Towards a New Remedy for Pollution of the Sea' (1989) 1 Marine Policv Reports 151. 
39 Maritime Liens and Claims (1985) at 72. 
40 Price The Law of Maritime Liens (1940); Thomas op cit, and Jackson Enforcement of Maritime Claims 
(1985). 
41 [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep 188. 
42 [1976) 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 at 9; [1976] 1 AllER 920. 
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The maritime lien for damage is restricted in the amount of the charge it represents against 
___ !?~v-~-~~~l_t?_~~ ext~nt of~~~ ?-~~~~•s liabil~ty~~ -~11d i~-!~i~_r_egard_it __ !~-}~P-~!tcl.n! tc~--~e~u- in ________ _ 
mind that the owner may limit liability in terms of the Merchant Shipping Act. Section 261 
of that Act provides, inter alia, for instances in which the owner of maritime property will 
not be liable for the whole of the damage 44. To the extent then that the ship-owner is 
entitled to limit liability for the damage, the maritime lien is restricted in the amount of the 
charge it represents on the arrested property. 
The Merchant Shipping Act45 provides furfhermore that where loss is caused by the fault of 
two or more ships, liability to make good any damage or loss shall be in proportion to the 
degree in which each ship was at fault: if it is not possible to establish different degrees of 
fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally. This enacts the English rule of 
apportionment. The Merchant Shipping Act further provides for joint liability for damages 





Thomas op cit at 134. 
261(1) -
'The owner of a ship, whether registered in the Republic or not, shall not, if any loss of life or personal 
injury to any person, or any loss or damage to any property or rights of any kind, whether movable or 
immovable, is caused without his actual fault or privity'. 
51 of 1957, s 255 
(1) Whenever by the fault of two or more ships damage or loss is caused to one or more of them 
or to the cargo or freight of one or more of them or to any property on board one or more of 
them, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in 
(2) 
which each ship was at fault: Provided that - ~t 
(a) if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish 
(b) 
(c) 
different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally; and 
nothing in this section shall operate so as to render any ship liable for any loss or 
damage to which her fault has not contributed; and 
nothing in this section shall affect the liability of any person under any contract, or 
shall be construed as imposing any liability upon any person from which he is 
exempted by any contract or by any provision of law, or as affecting the right of any 
person to limit his liability in the manner provided by Jaw. 
For the purposes of this chapter, references to damage or loss caused by the fault of a ship 
shall be construed as including references to any salvage or other expenses, consequent upon 
that fault, recoverable at law by way of damages. 
Section 256 
Damages for personal injury -
(1) Whenever loss of life or personal injuries are suffered by any person on board a ship owing to 
(2) 
the fault of that ship and of any other ship or ships, the liability of the owners of the ships 
concerned shall be joint and several. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving any person of any right of defence on 
which, independently of this section, he might have relied in an action brought against him by 
the person injured, or any person entitled to sue in respect of such loss of life, or shall affect 
-24 
~ 
With regard to the property that can be encumbranced by a damage maritime lien, under 
English law, as at the relevant date, the position was that it was available over the ship, its 
- - --~---------·------ ----···--- --------· -------··· ------------- - ----- -- - --- - ----·- -----------·•--·-· --· - -- - ~---- ------- -·. - -- - --- -·----- -- --- --·-·· --· - -
tackle, apparel, furniture48 and the freight, subject only to the qualification in respect of the 
freight that the ship must have been engaged in a commercial enterprise49. The maritime 
lien was for the value of those items at time of accrual of action and not subsequent 
accretions of value. That would then also be the position under South African law. 
In English law the lien does not attach to the cargo carried on board and this would 
presumably exclude containers housing th.\t cargo as well, nor to the luggage or personal 
effects of passengers or members of the crew5°. 
the right of any person to limit his liabilit~n cases to which this section relates in the manner 
provided by law. · 
47 Section 4(2) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 1956 provides that '[N]othing in this Act contained 
shall derogate in any manner from the provisions of any law relating to collisions or accidents at sea, 
, 
48 The Alexander (1812) 1 Dods 278. 
49 The Orphans (1871) LR 3 A & E 308. 
50 Thomas op cit at 135. 
2.2 Wages lien both for seamen and masters 
The Supieme·-court's· aariiiralty jiiriscficfioiifor each d' these-maritime claims is established -
by section l(l)(s) of the Act51, and, as regards the law applicable to such claims, the courts' 
admiralty jurisdiction under the Colonial Court of Admiralty Act of 1890 included both 
claims for a seaman's and a master's wage52. Therefore, in terms of s 6(1) of the Act, 
English admiralty law as at 1 November 1983 is to be applied, in so far as it can, to these 
claims. The provisions of s 6(2) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act read with the 
phrase 'in so far as it can' ins 6(1) must be\nterpreted to mean that pertinent South 
'---... 
African legislation in conflict with English law must be taken to have superseded it. So to 
determine the extent of the seamen's wages maritime lien one has, in the first instance, to· 
have recourse to South African statutes and thereafter to English law as at the relevant 
date. 
It is, however, perhaps more convenient, for reasons which will become apparent, to begin 
with a consideration of the relevant English law. Under English law the maritime lien for 
seaman's wages was one of the earliest maritime liens recognised. The basis of this 
maritime lien was a service rendered to the ship other than in terms of a 'contract' of 
employment. The lien arose from the fact of service rendered to a ship and was 
independent of agreement and of personal liability on the pa'rt of the ship-owner53• As 
early as 1704 it was held to have been 'usage time out of mind' that the liability of the ship 
was distinct from the liability of the owner54 and to the present day the source of the 
maritime lien for seaman's wages, in particular, remains unchanged for it has never been 
incorporated into legislation. 
51 Section 1(1) ' ... any claim for, arising out of or relating to -
(s) 'the employment of any master, officer or seaman of a ship in connection with or in relation lo 
a ship, including the remuneration of any 5'1Ch person, and contributions in respect of any such 
person lo any pension fund, provident fund, ·medical aid fund, benefit fund, similar fund, 
association or institution in relation to or for the benefit of any master, officer or seaman;' 
Compare this with the origin~ section under the 1983 Act, l(l)(n) which read 'any claim by a master 
or member of the crew of a snip arising out of his employment;'. 
52 Section 10 of the Admiralty Co'urt Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Viet c 10). 
53 The Castlegate [1893] AC 38 at 52. 
54 Wells v Osman (1704) 2 Ld Raym 1044 at 1045 qu~ted in Thomas op cit at 170 al footnote 15. 
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Statutes enlarging the jurisdiction of the English admiralty court, as distinct from those 
__ .______ conferring newjuri~dicti_on C>n!he -~-~u;t, JQ_ ~n_t~~!~i11 claims__for ~ag~-~-h~ve _bt!e!!.fQnstrued_ _ _______ _ 
by the English courts as impliedly extending the ambit of the lien55• It is probably accurate 
to state therefore, that to the extent that the court has admiralty jurisdiction over claims for 
seaman's wages there exists to an equal extent a maritime lien: the jurisdiction and the 
existence of the maritime lien are co-terminous56. 
Originally under English law there were a number of restrictions on wage claims, but over 
time these have been removed. It was, for'instance, originally a requirement in English law 
that freight must have been earned before wages could be claimed but this requirement 
was abrogated by s 183 of the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 and under 
South African legislation57 it is specifically provided that the, 
'right to wages shall not depend on the earning of freight, and every seaman and 
apprentice-officer of a South African ship who would be entitled to demand and 
recover wages if the ship in which he has served had earned freight shall subject to 
all other laws and conditions applicable to the case, be entitled to recover the same 
notwithstanding that freight has not been earned.' 
It was furth~rmore, originally a requirement for the wage claim in English law that the 
wages had to have been earned on board the vessel. That requirement was liberally 
construed under English law which recognised such claim even where the seaman was away 
from the ship58. There is no reference made in South AfriGan legislation to such a 
requirement and the definition of the maritime claim for seaman's wages in the Act is cast 1 
in extremely wide terms as a claim for wages 'arising out of employment'59 which would 
point in the direction of the wide construction under English law. 
55 171e Mary Anne (1865) LR 1 A & E 8; 771e Henrich Bjom (1886) 11 App Cas 270; 771e Sara (1889) 14 
App Cas 209, and The Halcyon Skies (1977] 1 OB 14 at 28F-30F. 
56 171e Halcyon Skies (1977] 1 OB 14 at 31E. 
57 Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951, s 138. 
58 The Halcyon Skies (op cit at 22D). 
59 See the definition section quoted supra at 24 footnote 51. 
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Originally, too, in English law a distinction was drawn between 'ordinary' and 'special' 
employment contracts, the difference being that an ordinary contract was consistently 
. -·-------··----·--·-·---------·-·----- ---------~-·-··-··----·------· --------- ·-----··-··-··· -- - -- -------·-----·· -------··-·- -----
perceived as 'a hiring on the usual terms made by word and writing only and not by deed,60 
.,. the essence of the distinction going to both substance and form. But this distinction was 
abolished bys 10 of the Admiralty Court Act of 186161. Since that was the jurisdiction 
conferred on the South African courts under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, the 
distinction does not apply in South Africa. It is evident that, under English law, the 
jurisdiction of the court over the claim and the maritime lien are co-extensive. In South 
\ 
Africa the maritime lien would appear to have been modified by certain statutes but these 
have perhaps served to reinforce, rather than alter, the position that existed at English law. 
The language of the South African Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, before the 1992 
amendment, with the inclusion of the phrase 'member of crew' rather than simply 'seamen' 
might have appeared to restrict the wages jurisdiction. The term 'seaman', used in English 
law, had always been liberally construed to include everyone on board the ship with the 
exception of the master. So the term 'seaman' has been held to include a surgeon, cook, 
carpenter and bar steward62. 
It seems unlikely that it was intended, by the selection of the phrase 'member of the crew' 
to alter the jurisdiction. Section 2 of the South African Mer~hant Shipping Act63 defines 
'seaman' as meaning 'any person (except a master, pilot or apprentice-officer) employed or 
engaged in any capacity as a member of the crew of a ship'. This illustrates the point that 
the South African statute, the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, which would appear 
to have modified the position at English law, has simply reinforced that position. It is also 






Howe v Napier (1766) 4 Burr 1944 quoted in Thomas op cit at 171 footnote 28. 
The section reads, '[T]he High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim by a seaman of 
any ship for wages earned by him on board the ship, whether the same be due under a special contract 
or otherwise .. .'. 
Staniland 'Should a Seaman Sue as a Favoured Litigant? Industrial Law Journal 451 at 465 and the 
authorities cited therein. 
Act 57 of 1951, as amended. 
28 
and this must be construed as indicating an intention to return to, if indeed there had ever 
_ _ _ _ ___ ~ee~~ ~~~~~t-~-~ _!:~~•-t~_e pos!!i_~?: ~~-Engl~s~- la~: __ It_c_e~(l.inly indicates an_ intention_ to ____ _ __ _ ____ _ ___ _ 
remove any ambiguity that might have arisen and possible constriction of the claim. 
The general approach of the admiralty judges from the earliest times has been to view the 
concept of wages broadly so as to include virtually any benefits which could fairly be said to 
have been earned by the seaman's services, and in considering what items may or may not 
properly fall 'within the rubric of a wage to look to the totality of the employment 
relationship,65. The concept of wages has been construed liberally not only to include 
wages in the narrow sense but also benefits which are incidental to the seaman's 
employment and claims arising from wrongful dismissal or other breaches of contract66. 
This expanded view of wages which could be said to encompass any amount received by the 
person concerned which could fairly be said to have been earned by his services67, has been 
accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the maritime lien. 
The Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 195168 defines 'wages' to include 'any emoluments' and 
this, considered with the phrase 'arising out of employment' in definitions section of the 
Act, must be taken to have been intended to give rein to the broadest interpretation. It 
would seem therefore that the English precedents69 which have extended so liberally the 
meaning of the terms 'wages' to include emoluments and cogipensation in the nature of 
damages for wrongful dismissal, are then also to be considered to be a part of South 
African law 7°. To the extent that a maritime claim is in the natur,e of a wage it is 









Thomas op cit at 182; 111e Halcyon Skies (1977) 1 QB'14 at 22-3. 
Thomas op cit at 178. 
The British Trade (1924) P 104 at 108-9. 
Section 2. 
Thomas op cit at para 321 for a list of examples of claims recognised under this Heading. 
Staniland op cit at 472. 
The Halcyon Skies (1977) 1 QB 14 at 31G. 
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As far as some specific examples are concerned, repatriation expenses under s 114(2) of the 
__ __ _ ______ ~~!-~~~nt S~~ppi11g Act ar~ recovera~Je as wages_ d:iieJg_s~arneI}, a,rrc! _sinc~ _ _wages attract a_ 
maritime lien it would seem that these expenses would likewise attract a maritime lien. 
Where a voyage for which a seaman has been engaged is discontinued, the seaman is, in 
terms of s 116(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act, entitled to the wages to which he would 
have been entitled if his service had been wrongfully terminated by the ship-owner 72. 
Again, since the entitlement falls with the definition of the claim for wages, it could be 
argued that such claim attracts a maritime lien. 
In terms of s 142 of the Merchant Shipping Act, if a seaman is discharged otherwise than in 
accordance with the terms of that seaman's engagement before the commencement of the 
voyage or before one month's wages have been earned, and that discharge is without fault 
on the part of the seaman concerned or consent by that seaman, the seaman will be entitled 
to compensation not exceeding one month's wages for any damage caused by the discharge. 
Again, since that compensation relates to earnings that are due, it is arguable that a 
maritime lien would attach in respect of that claim. 
As an illustration of the liberal construction of the term 'wages', the South African case of 
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co of Chicago v Greek Seamen's Pension , (_ ~ 
f>-1 X ,~dl'~ .· 
Fund73 involved a pension fund suing the ship-owner for the employer's contribution due '< 
by it in respect of seamen employed on its vessel. The Court examined the history of the 
claim and considered that the phrase 'seaman's wages' was wide enough to include 
contributions a seaman's employer, by virtue of a contract of employment, was statutorily 
obliged to pay in respect of a seaman and for the benefit of that seaman to a pension 
fund 74. 
72 Section 117. 
73 1989 (2) SA 514 (D). 
74 Ibid at 533B-F. 
In the case of a claim by a crew member for damages arising out of an assault by, for 
_________ example, the I!_l_a.ster, it i_s Q~gJ?ably true to !i~Y _t_ht!tir1 ~o_Jctr asJlult claim c_Qyers the injuries __ _ 
sustained it would not attract a maritime lien but to the extent that it seeks to compensate 
the seaman for wages not earned as a result of those injuries, because the seaman was 
unable to work while recuperating, the claim for compensatory damages might well be 
considered to attract a maritime lien, the claim being for loss of earnings arising out of an 
injury caused by the assault in the course and scope of the seaman's employment. 
\ ' 
The maritime lien is protected by s 134( 1) of the Merchant Shipping Act which provides 
that a seaman shall not by agreement forfeit the maritime lien on the ship for wages or be 
deprived of any remedy for the recovery of wages to which, in the absence of the 
agreement, the seaman would have been entitled or abandon any right that he may have or 
obtain in the nature of salvage, and every stipulation in any agreement with the crew in 
consistent with the provisions of this section shall be void. 
The basis of the maritime lien was a service rendered to the ship other than in terms of a 
'contract' of employment. The lien therefore arose from the fact of service rendered to a 
ship and was independent of agreement and of personal liability on the part of the ship-
owner 75. Personal liability on the part of the ship-owner is not required because the 
jurisprudential basis of the claim is the service to the ship wltich has been rendered 
irrespective of whether the seaman was employed by a person with no or defective title: 
such would not be a bar to the existence of a maritime lien. 
The potential for hardship in this principle is evident if one considers two possible 
scenario's. The first is where the vessel is chartered by demise and the demise charterer is 
responsible for hiring the crew. Where the charterer then defaults in respect of the 
' '-obligation to pay the crew wages, they would enjoy a maritime lien over the vessel for their 
wages. The second scenario would be where the vessel is stolen and the thief employs a 
75 The Castlegate [1893] AC 38 at 52. 
crew. If that crew were not to receive remuneration, they would have a maritime lien 
against the vessel. 
A further point worth mentioning, perhaps, is that English courts have exhibited a 
reluctance to entertain wage claims which entail the arrest of foreign vessels. Traditionally, 
they have exercised their discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in such 
circumstances, not on the grounds of forum non conveniens, but arising out of a reluctance 
to meddle in the affairs of foreign States. Remnants of this are to be found in the 
Admiralty Rules which require that in the case of such a wage claim the foreign consular 
representative be advised of any such proceedings before their institution 76. Whether this 
is to be taken to be indicative of a general reluctance to entertain the claims of foreign 
seamen is not altogether clear. 
The property capable of being encumbranced by the maritime lien for wages, seen as 
essentially recompense for a service to the ship, logically includes the ship, its tackle, 
furniture, and to every part or fragment thereof, even when such part or fragment is 
separated from the vessel by accident or storm 77. Improvements and accretions effected 
subsequent to the creation of the lien are also so charged 78• 
The lien extends to the freight, including that payable by sub-charterers. The ship 
(>,1 
represents the first charge and if the proceeds are insufficient the freight may be called into 
court 79. There is no lien for wages on the cargo because it is the service to the ship that 
forms the basis of the claim80. 
As regards specifically the master's wages, the master was not viewed, initially anyway, with 
the same favour, in English admiralty law, as the seaman and it was only as a result of 
statutory intervention in the nineteenth century8l_that the master came to enjoy a similar 
76 Rule 3(4). 
77 Thomas op cit at 318. 
78 The Aline (1839) 1 W Rob 111. 
79 The Castlegate [1893] AC 38. 
80 The Rigby Grove (1843) 2 W Rob 52. 
81 Merchant Shipping Act 1844 (7 & 8 Viet c 112), s 16. 
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privilege and security in relation to wages. Before this time the employment of the master 
had been regarded as a personal engagement with the ship-owner and not as a service to 
-----------···-- ·--· --·· -- .. ·- -------- -- ·----·------··--·-------- . - ·-···- - ·- _.. ·--·- --------· - ····---- ---·- ----·--·- -- . --·---·--· ---•-•·--•-~-- -··- ---- ·-·· . -
the ship. The section conferred on the master 'all Rights, Liens, Privileges and Remedies 
... which ... belong to any Seaman or Mariner'. 
This parallel with seamen's wages set the pattern that has been followed ever since in 
English admiralty law. The current position in England is governed bys 18 of the 1970 
Merchant Shipping Act which reads, '[t]he master of a ship shall have the same lien for his 
remuneration ... as a seaman for his wages~. It must necessarily follow from the equation 
of the master's rights with those of the seaman that a master's lien enjoys the same ambit 
and scope as a seaman's wages lien and also that it arises independently of agreement and 
any personal liability on the part of the ship-owner. In the case of The Edwin82, the fact 
that the master was hired by one who had fraudulently obtained possession of the ship was 
held not to have prevented the master from having a maritime lien upon the ship for wages, 
provided the master was ignorant of the fraud. 
Unlike a seaman's lien, however, it would appear that, at least in English law, a master's 
lien is not subject to the protection of the English Merchant Shipping Act 1970, s 16(1), by 
which a seaman's lien is made incapable of being renounced by agreement83. Section 
143(1) of the South African Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 19~1 provides that the master of 
a South African ship has the same rights, liens and remedies for the recovery of his wages 
as a seaman under the Act84. Whether this means that the master enjoys the same 
protection as the seaman does under the Act85 against renunciation of the protection 
afforded by such lien is not clear, but the issue is certainly arguable. 
Sir Francis Jeune in The Emville (No 2)86 considered that the master's wages included 'not 
~ . 
only what a master gets as a wages but what he obtains in the course of his service as 
82 (1864) B & L 281 at 285. 
83 The William Tell [1892] P 337. 
84 Havelock v Davidson (1919) 40 NLR 290. 
85 Section 134(1). 
86 [1904] P 422 at 428. 
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recompense for the execution of his duty'. This provides confirmation, if any was needed, 
that the concept of wages in relation to the master is to b~~s lJ_t:_QciQly<-:<:>r1st_fll~_cLa._s it_has_ 
-·-··-·- - . -· ·- . -- - ·-···-- ---·-·--· - --·-. ···- ··-·----·- .. -· - ... . -- -- ..... ----· -· . - - - . - ----- --- - . -- -
been in relation to seamen. 
Furthermore, in terms of the South African Merchant Shipping Act, s 144, the master is 
entitled to damages for unreasonable delay in payment of wages. It is doubtful whether the 
· maritime lien would extend to such claim on the grounds that such damages could not be 
regarded as recompense for services. 
2.3 Master's disbursements 
The admiralty jurisdiction of the South African courts over claims for a master's 
disbursements is established bys l(l)(o)87 of the Act. Since the claim was one in respect of 
which the court had jurisdiction iq terms of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, before 
the enactment of the 1983 Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, the law applicable in 
respect of such claim, in terms of s 6(1) of the Act, is English law as at 1 November 1983. 
The English Admiralty Court had no original jurisdiction in respect of a master's 
disbursements. The jurisdiction was acquired in terms of the 1861 Admiralty Court Act, s 
10. The question arose as to whether and, if so, to what extent, the maritime claim gave 
. rise to a maritime lien and being a statutory creation, the aQSwer was to be found in the 
construction of that statute. In the case of The Mary Anne88, Dr Lushington considered 
that since the court had previously acquired limited jurisdiction under the Merchant 
Shipping Act.of 185489, specifically in relation to master's disbursement claims, the effect 
of s 10 of the 1861 was to extend an existing jurisdiction. The learned judge therefore 
adopted the presumption that the Legislature intended the creation of a maritime lien. 
The decision in the Mary Anne was overturned in..,Tlze Sara9<..l_ As a result of this 
87 Section 1(1) ' ... claim for, arising out of or relating to -
(o) 'payments or disbursements by a master, shipper, charterer, agent or any other person for or 
on behalf of or on account of a ship or the owner or charterer of a ship'. 
88 (1865) LR 1 A & E 8. 
89 Section 191. 
90 (1889) 14 App Cas 209. 
uncertainty in regard to the existence of such a maritime lien, the Legislature intervened to 
... ·- --~-?~~r .~~-th~-~~~t~.~.~~ express statutory m.ar~~~~ lie~ for disburs~~ents. Thi.slien was_ 
first created by the Merchant Shipping Act 1889, s 1, the terms of which were reproduced 
in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, s 167(2)91. 
This statutory conferment of a maritime lien for disbursements on the master is effected in 
South Africa by the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act92 which reads: 
'The master of a South African ship shall, so far as the case permits, have the same 
rights, liens and remedies for the recovery of disbursements or liabilities properly 
made or incurred by him on account of the ship as a master has for the recovery of 
his wages.' 
Since the master enjoys a maritime lien for the recovery of wages, so too, is there a 
maritime lien for the recovery of disbursements. 
The maritime lien for disbursements is a privilege which enures to the benefit of a ship's 
master only and does not extend to seamen or, for that matter, any other persons. The . 
maritime claim for disbursements, in South Africa has been extended in two directions by 
the amendments effected by the 1992 Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act: 
firstly, by extending the claim to embrace those for disbursements made by the shipper or 
its agent, and secondly, to cover disbursements made on the account of the ship-owner or 
the charterer. The jurisdiction over disbursement claims is ~rthermore extended by 
paragraph (p) of the definition section of the Act to. include, 
' ... disbursements made by, or the acts or omissions of, any person appointed to act 
or who acted or failed to act -
(i) as an agent, whether as a ship's, clearing, forwarding or other kind of agent, 
in respect of any ship or any goods carried or to be carried or which were or 
ought to have been carried in a ship; or 
(ii) as a broker in respect of any charter, sale or any other agreement relating to 
a ship or in connection with the cai;riage of goods in a ship or in connection 
with any insurance of a ship or any portion or part thereof or of any other ' 
property referred to in section 3(5); or 
91 For the provisions of the subsection refer to footnote 57 in Thomas op cit at 201. 
92 Section 143(2). 
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(iii) as attorney or adviser in respect of any matter mentioned in subparagraphs 
(i) and (ii); 
alone. 
Comprehended by the notion of 'disbursement', which has not been defined by statute nor 
by any attempt at an all-embracing judicial determination, is an expense or liability 
incurred by the master in the performance of his duties as such and which is immediately 
necessary in the interests of the vessel93. In The Feronia94 it was held, in relation to the 
\ 
issue of the ambit of the court's jurisdiction over such claims, that disbursement claims 
included those for, 
'all proper expenditure, made by the master upon the ship, whether the particular 
articles, the subject of this expenditure, were obtained by immediate or promised 
payment'. 
Although not specified, there are certain requirements; implicit in the reference to 'proper', 
that, it seems, are generally regarded as being necessary for a valid claim to arise. In the 
first instance, the expense or liability must have been made or incurred by a master in his 
capacity as such, and, secondly, the expense or liability must have been incurred on account 
of the ship in the sense of being for its operational benefit. 
Thirdly, the expense or liability must have been the product.,of a transaction entered into by 
the master. It seems that it is of the essence of the disbursement that the master himself 
have assumed a personal liability in respect of which it is intended to seek indemnity from 
the ship-owner: if the master's intention was simply to pledge the owner's credit; no 
disbursement claim arises. In the fourth instance, the expense must relate to an item of 
service which was immediately necessary. In The Ripon City95 it was held that the 
disbursement must have been 'necessary for the 1'.urpose of navigation of the vessel in the 
service on which ship was engaged'. 
93 Thomas op cit at 193-4. 
94 (1868) LR 2 A & E 65 at 75. 
95 Op cit at 234. 
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Fifthly, the expense or disbursement must have been incurred by the master in the course 
of his employment. In The Castlegate96 it was held that the transactim_i __ in re~~ti_2n_~9-~l1i.c:h_ .. ···-· ____ ·-·--
----------------- ----------------------·-·- ·-··--------------- ----- - - - -- -· --·-· --- . ---·- --------- --- --- -
payment was made or promised had to have been one within the general ~uthority 
incidental to the master's employment as such. Finally, there can be no disbursement if the 
master thereby avoids the conse.quences of his own wrongdoing, so that the liability of the 
master responsible for damage to an innocent ship as a result of his negligent navigation 
cannot be cloaked in the guise of a disbursement97. 
There is the further issue of whether the d1sbursement maritime lien is dependent on 
personal liability of the owner. Being a creature of statute, the maritime lien's nature and 
scope fell to be determined by reference to the terms of that statute. On the wording of the 
relevant statutory provisions, it might have appeared that the objective of the Legislature 
was to create a maritime lien to the same effect as that for seaman's wages but this has not 
been the approach. The relevant section98 came under scrutiny in the case of The 
Castlegate99 in which the court came to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature 
was to restore the position to that existing before the case of The Sara1. Lord Watson 
summarised the early law: , 
'These cases establish the principle that there could be no lien upon [a] ship in 
respect of disbursements for which the master had no authority to bind the owner, 
or, in other words, that no maritime lien could attach to the res for any sum which 
was not a personal debt of its owner.'2 ~.t 
96 [1893) AC 38. 
97 The Limerick (1876) 1 PD 411 at 413. 
98 Merchant Shipping Act of 1889, s 1. 
99 [1893) AC 38. 
1 (1889) 14 App Cas 209. 
2 The Castlegate (op cit at 51). 
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The maritime lien is therefore dependent on the personal liability of owner which remains 
a requirement. The basis would appear to be an implied authorisation of master by the 
. --·-------·--··---- ·-- - --- -- ------· ·-- --- ---- ·····-·--··-·----.. --.------ ·-----··- - ··-·- --· -------· . ·- ·- . -- - ··------··· - ------ -·· ·-·····----·-··- -· -- ------ - -- - --·--·· 
ship-owner or a representation by the ship-owner that the master had the requisite 
authority to incur liability on behalf of the ship-owner3. 
The significance of this would be, for instance, that in the case of a charter-party by demise, 
the master, who would be the agent of the charterer would have no maritime lien for 
disburseme·nts. These would have been made on behalf of the charterer and the ship-
owner would therefore not be personally liable. There is an exception to the principle 
enunciated in The Castlegate and it is one which Thomas4 suggests is founded on estoppel 
though the reasoning is not couched in precisely those terms. In the The Ripon City, 
Gorell Barnes J said: 
'I consider that it is also right and reasonable that persons who have rendered 
services to a vessel under circumstances which entitle them to treat her as owned by 
the persons in possession should have the same rights against the vessel as if her real 
owners had been in possession.' 
The facts of The Ripon City are distinguishable from those of The Castlegate. In The 
Castlegate the master was unaware of the arrangement between the owners and the other 
party whereas in The Ripon City the master knew of the terms of the charter-party. In the 
latter the master was at fault whereas in the former case he was not. 
~t 
The property capable of being encumbranced by a maritime lien for master's 
disbursements is the same as that for wages, namely over the ship, its apparel and the 
freight, -but not the cargo on the same reasoning as would apply with regard to the lien for 
wages. 
..._ 
3 Thomas op cit at 357. 
4 Ibid at 203. 
5 (1897] P 226. 
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2.4 The salvage maritime lien 
-rn-south Africanaamiraltylaw, s-l(l){k).oftheimenoedAcYconfers jurisdiction· on the 
-------· ----- -··· -------- -····--·· ~ 
Supreme Court in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction to hear and determine salvage 
claims6• The wording of the amended section is sufficiently close to that of the previous 
section 7 to permit the inference that the only significant change intended by the Legislature 
was to extend the jurisdiction to cover salvage of aircraft. 
As With the maritime liens discussed, to de~ermine whether and, if so, to what extent a 
salvage claimant enjoyed a maritime lien, the South African Courts must, in terms of s 6(1) 
of the Act, apply the law which the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction would have applied as at 1 November 1983, the date of 
commencement of the South African Act8. 
In English law the salvage maritime lien which arose under the general maritime law was 
co-terminous with the geographical ambit of the original jurisdiction and accordingly 
confined to salvage on the high seas9. Section 6 of the 1840 Act extended the sa,lvage 
jurisdiction to include salvage within the body of a county, a formulation that has been 
followed in subsequent legislative enactments. 
It was assumed in The Veritas10 that the maritime lien had lµcewise been extended, a 
conclusion consistent with the statutory cannon of construction adopted by the courts when 
construing a statute which extended the jurisdiction in relation to a claim which was 
establis~~d as a maritime lien under the original admiralty jurisdiction. 
6 (1) ' ... any claim for, arising out of or relating to - ... 
(k) salvage, including salvage relating to any aircraft and the sharing or apportionment of salvage 
and any right in respect of property salved or which would, but for the negligence or default of 
the salvor or a person who attempted to s~ve it, have been salved;'. 
7 Section, l(l)(j), · 
'any claim for or in the nature of salvage, including any claim relating to the sharing or apportionment 
of salvage and any claim by any person having a right in respect of property salved or which would but 
for the negligence or default of the salvor or would be salvor have been salved;'. 
8 Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and Others 1989 ( 4) 325 (A) at 333C-D. 
9 Thomas op cit at 152. 
10 [1901] P 304 Gorell Barnes J at 314. 
· 39 
Since the jurisdiction and lien are co-extensive, to establish a maritime lien it simply has to 
be established that there is a valid claim for salvage: th_~ pre-requisites for the lien are__ _ _ .. __________ _ 
those for the claim conferring jurisdiction. 
The first requirement for any salvage claim is that the property saved must have been in 
danger in the sense of being at peril or in distress11. Furthermore, salvage services in the 
form of an intentional act on the part of the salvor performed with the objective of 
rendering assistance, the dominant motive being of acting in the interest of the res or life at 
risk, must have been rendered12. Those services must have been voluntary in the sense of 
not being in consequence of any pre-existing contractual or statutory duty13 or any interest 
of self preservation14. 
The services rendered must, furthermore, have led to the saving of property15 since the 
salvor's compensation depends on saving of property which forms the fund from which the 
award is payable16. Finally, the property saved must have been property that is the proper 
subject of salvage. By this is meant the ship, the freight, the cargo, and property associated 
with the maritime adventure, namely derelict, flotsam, jetsam, lagan and wreck17. 
As far as precisely what is comprehended by the term 'ship', it seems that, in English law, 
the statutory definition is not regarded as conclusive of the issue. The term, it seems, has a 
~' far wider connotation than the term would suggest. That the South African courts would 
adopt a liberally approach in this regard would appear to be reinforced by the wide terms 
of the definition of 'ship' in the 1983 Act, which reads, 
'any vessel used or capable of being used on the sea or internal waters, and includes 
any hovercraft power boat, yacht, fishing boat, submarine vessel, barge, crane barge, 
11 'Georgetta Lawrence' 1• 'Calcutta' (1878) 8 Buch 102 at 105; The Charlotte (1848) 3 W Rob 68. 
12 'Georgetta Lawrence' v 'Calcutta' (1878) 8 Buch 102 at 105; 771e Annapolis (1861) Lush 295 at 355; The 
Magdalen (1861) LI Adm 22. ,.. 
13 Maytom v 'Harry Escombe' 1920 AD 187 at 194; 771e Zephyr (1827) 2 Hag Adm 43: 77,e Cayo Bonito 
[1904] P 310; 771e Lomonosoff [1921] P 97. 
14 '.fW Sauer', Master etc of v 'Sellasia', Owners of SS 1926 CPD 437 at 440. 
15 Maytom 1• 'Harry Escombe' 1920 AD 187 at 192. 
16 The Melanie (Owners) 1• 771e San Onofre (Owners) [1925] AC 246; 771e Tojo Maru [1972] AC 242 (HL). 
17 The Gas Float Whitton No 2 [1896] P 42 (CA) at 63 affirmed sub nomine Wells v Owners of the Gas• 
Float Whitton No 2 [ 1897] AC 337 per Lord Herschel at 345. 
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floarting crane, floating dock, oil or other floatinf rig, floating mooring installation 
or similar floating installation, whether self-propelled or not'. 
--Toe·term'apparel'would encompass ptop·erty associated with ship othei'"tlfaii iKlii.Jll,-- ·· · - · -------- - ----
machinery, provisions and cargo so it would include equipment, tackle, furnishings, boats, 
navigational instrumeqts and other similar property. 'Cargo' in this context is a broad 
expression relating to all property carried on board a ship and, it seems, would include 
goods transported in tow. 
The terms 'flotsam', 'jetsam' and 'lagan' are terms of antiquity and comprehend goods 
\ 
found at sea which were formerly part of ship's cargo. The terms are distinguished 
according to the circumstances of their being cast into the sea. All three categories relate 
to cargo which was initially conveyed in a ship which has foundered and which cargo has 
been swept to sea as a direct consequence of the foundering or has been intentionally cast 
into the sea in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the loss of the vessel 18. Derelict is property 
which has been voluntarily abandoned at sea without hope of recovery and without an 
intention of returning to it. Wreck is probably a residual class of property which extends 
the classes already enumerated and as such would include an part or fragment of a ship, 
her apparel or cargo19. 
' As far as the freight is concerned, where the salvage service results in a ship-owner earning 
I 
freight which would otherwise have been lost or at risk of being lost, the freight earned is 
charged with the salvor's maritime lien20. 
18 Constable v Gamble (1601) 5 Co Rep Pt V 106a, 1066 quoted in Thomas op cit at 157. 
'Flotsam is when a ship is sunk, or otherwise perished, and the goods float on the sea; jetsam is when 
the ship is in danger of being sunk and to lighten the ship the goods are cast into the sea, and 
afterwards notwithstanding the ship perish. Lagan ~el potius ligan) is when the goods which arc so cast 
into the sea, and afterwards the ship perishes, and such goods cast are so heavy that they sink to the 
bottom, and the mariners, to the intent to have them again, tie them to a buoy or cork, or such other 
thing that will not sink, so that they may find them again, & dicitur lig a ligando; and none of these 
goods which are called flotsam, jetsam, or ligan, are called wreck so long as they remain in or upon the ' 
sea; but if any of them by the sea be put on the land, then they shall be said wreck.' 
19 Thomas op cit at 160. 
20 The Westminster (1841) 1 W Rob 229. 
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Once these criteria are satisfied, a legitimate claim for salvage arises. The quantification of 
the salvor's claim is matter for judicial discretion or arbitration. Where the salvor has 
-· -·· - ------- - -·--··· ·-----------·---·--·---.- --------------·------------- ----- -- -- ---- --···-- --------·- ·------- -- -- ---·---··-··-- -
contributed in part only to the saving of the property in question, the awar_d of salvage will 
be in proportion to the contribution of that salvor's service to the success of the salvage. 
The salvor who renders beneficial services to a ship and associated property undoubtedly 
enjoys a maritime lien over the salved property to the extent of the salvor's claim21 . The 
lien accrues from the moment the service is rendered and encumbrances the benefited res 
until it is discharged lawfully22. Conferring 'a benefit on the salved property is not only the 
foundation of the salvage maritime lien, but it is also the quantitative measure of the 
maritime lien: the lien accrues only to the extent of the benefit conferred. 
Personal liability on the part of the ship-owner is not a pre-requisite for the existence of the 
claim for salvage. The salvage maritime lien accrues independently of any voluntarily 
assumed obligation on the part of the owner to pay an award23 and, in this regard, it is 
analogous to bottomry24 and wages25. The foundation of the lien is, quite simply, the 
beneficial service rendered to an imperilled res. Consequently, the salvage lien accrues 
notwithstanding that the benefited res is in the possession or control of a party other than 
the owner. The maritime lien accrues when the salvage service is rendered even in the 
absence and without the knowledge of the res owner and, futtihermore, even where the 
services are justifiably performed against the wishes of the salved vessel or accepted under 
protest26. 
Under the general maritime law of England there was no salvage claimable for the saving 
of life at sea. This was so despite the very strong policy considerations militating in favour 
both of the recognition of such a salvage claim and maritime lien. The position was 
21 The Two Friends (1799) 1 C Rob 271; 77,e Veri1as [1901] P 304. 
22 The Mary Anne (1865) LR 1 A & E 8. 
23 Five Slee! Barges (1890) 15 PD 142. 
24 Infra at 43. 
25 Supra at 24. 
26 771e Kangaroo [1918] P 327; 771e Pretoria (1920) 5 Lloyd's Rep 112. 
remedied, under English law, by the Merchant Shipping Act27 which created a statutory 
___ _______ _ right t() -~if~ ~a!vag_e. ___ !Ee_ eff~ct _of th_e s~ctiq~-~~-~Q ~-~ti!l~ the _s.i._lyQ[J9 ~laim a _salyc:1,ge_ 
award from any property that had also been saved whether or not the salvor had made a 
contribution to the saving of the properiy28. It was uncertain in English law whether a 
maritime lien existed29. 
The position in South African law is governed predominantly by the provisions of the 
Merchant Shipping Act30 which confer a right to salvage for the saving of life from any ship 
on persons rendering salvage services within the territorial waters of the Republic or 
elsewhere in saving life from any South African ship. The salvage is payable by the owner 
of the ship and the owner of any wreck that may have been saved. The effect of the section 
is to entitle the salvor to claim life salvage from property which is also saved, even if the 
salvor made no contribution to the saving of that property. 
There is express reference in the section to the fact that the salvor is granted a lien upon 
the ship or wreck for the amount of the salvage due. It is submitted that this is a reference 
to the common law possessory lien and not to a maritime lien. But the intention of the 
Legislature, as evidenced by ss (2), is clearly to elevate the claim in priority and salvage in 
respect of the preservation of life, when payable by the owner of a ship, is payable in 
priority to all other claims for salvage. Not to have so eleva.ted the claim would have 
27 Act 1894, s 544. 
26 Thomas 'Life Salvage in Anglo American Law' 10 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 79. 
27 Thomas Maritime Liens British Shipping Laws vol 14. 
30 Section 300 - Salvage payable for life 
(1) When services are rendered within the territorial waters of the Republic in saving life from any 
ship, or elsewhere in saving life from any South African ship, there shall be payable to the 
salvor by the owner of the ship and the owner of any wreck that may have been saved, a 
reasonable amount of salvage, and the salvor shall have a lien upon the ship or wreck for the 
amount of the salvage due to him. , 
(2) Salvage in respect of the preservation of life; when payable by the owner of a ship, shall be 
payable in priority to all other claims for salvage. 
(3) When the ship or wreck is lost or the value thereof is insufficient, after payment of the actual 
expenses incurred, to pay the amount of salvage payable in respect of the preservation of life, 
the Minister may, in his discretion, awards to the salvor, out of moneys made available by 
Parliament for the purpose, such sum as he thinks fit, in whole or part satisfaction of any 
amount of salvage so left unpaid. 
exhibited a perverse ranking of values, assigning a lesser remedy in the case of the saving of 
life than for the saving of property . 
... ·-----~· - ... 
The section is of limited application in that it deals with salvage of life within South African 
territorial waters and saving of life on South African ships whether they be within South 
African territorial waters or not. As regards the position in the case of a non-South African 
ship outside the territorial waters of South Africa there is considerable uncertainty as to 
whether such salvage claim would give rise to a maritime lien. This uncertainty arises out 
of the fact that there is no clarity about the extent of the salvage maritime lien in relation 
to life salvage in English law31. Without salved property there can presumably be no 
question of a maritime lien32. 
2.5 Bottomry and respondentia maritime liens 
The South African courts' admiralty jurisdiction over bottomry and respondentia bonds is 
established bys l(l)(d)33 of the Act. These were maritime claims before the enactment of 
the 1983 Act and therefore in terms of s 6(1) English law is applicable. 
Bottomry has been defined as, 
'a contract in the nature of a mortgage on a ship, a ship and her freight, or a ship 
and her freight and cargo, whereby the master, in case of necessity and in the 
absence of other credit, borrows money at interest o~the security of the property 
hypothecated in order to enable the ship to continue her voyage, repayment 
depending on her safe arrival'.34 
A more comprehensive definition is provided by Lord Merrivale in The St George35 where 
he defined bottomey as an, 
'agreement where under a representative of a ship, in most instances the master, in 
circumstances of distress and necessity, and in the absence of any other source of 
finance or credit, hypothecates the ship ( or cargo in the case of respondentia) with a 
31 Thomas op cit at 294. 
32 Infra at 50. 
33 (1) ' ... any claim for, arising out of or relating to -
(d) 'any mortgage, hypothecation, right of retention, pledge or other charge on or of a ship, and 
any bottomry or respondentia bond;'. 
34 The Atlas (1827) 2 Hagg 48 at 53. 
35 [1926] P 217 at 226. 
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view to meeting the necessary expenditure or obtaining credit and so facilitating the 
safe continuation or completion of the voyage'. 
···-··-These were·amortg tffe·eatliest maritimeTierisTobe recognised and their origin and~ 
development were precipitated and fuelled by considerations of public policy and the 
notion of the service they represented to the ship. 
Bottomry and respondentia bonds were important commercial instruments enabling a 
master, during a voyage, to procure a loan or advance of credit against the security of the 
ship or cargo, in irder to secure the continu,_ation of the voyage in question. Apart from the 
difference in subject matter the concepts of bottomry and respondentia are synonymous. 
This hypothecation on bottomry was historically a primary source of shipping finance when 
the ship was distant from her home port. But in a world of improved communications and 
improved credit facilities the bottomry bond has inevitably declined in importance and is to 
all intents and purposes obsolete36. Price37, writing in 1940, commented that '[b]ottomry 
bonds have passed out of favour during the past hundred years'. Despite the fact that the 
concept is something of an anachronism, its study is useful for the insights it yields into the 
nature of the maritime lien. 
The effect of executing a bottomry or respondentia bond is to hypothecate expressly the res 
specified in the bond. This proprety thereafter stands as seGUrity for the loan, the 
repayment of which is enforceable by a proceeding in rem. The hypothecation gives the 
lender no title in, or possession of, the ship or cargo, but merely a claim against the res 
which is carried into effect by admiralty process. The nature of the hypothecation was 
considered in The Tobago38: 
'The person advancing the money on bonds of this nature, acquires by that act no 
property in the vessel: he acquires the ius in rem, but not the ius in re, until it has 
been converted and appropriated by the f~_al process by a court of justice. The 
36 Thomas op cit al 207 slates that the last recorded decision relating to bottomry was the case of The St 
George (op cit at 222) in which Lord Merrivale observed in relation to bottomry that it was 'a mode of 
raising money out of common use at the present day and unfamiliar in current practice'. 
37 The Law of Maritime Liens op cil at 29. 
38 (1804) 5 C Rob 218 at 222-3. 
property of the vessel continues in the former proprietor, who has given the right 
agamst it, but nothing more.' 
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--·---- -·- ·---·---- -·--·--·- ·-------···--·-··--------·---- ------A-person-who advanced money-or-credit on bottomry or respo;dentia-enjoyed a maritime 
lien on the res charged in respect of both the principal debt and interest39. The lien arose 
at the moment of the agreement and to the extent of the value of the property charged but 
was only enforceable on the safe completion of the voyage for which the loan or credit was 
at risk, or upon such date thereafter as might be specified in the bond, or upon the 
occurrence of some act or incident which caused the lien to accrue earlier. The lien 
\ 
endured for as long as the res charged survived; with the destruction of the res the lien was 
expunged40. 
The jurisdiction and maritime lien are co-extensive so that the pre-requisites for 
jurisdiction had only to be established to determine the existence and scope of the 
maritime lien. As regards the pre-requisites for valid bottomry and respondentia bonds, the 
core of the validity such bonds is founded upon the presence both of an immediate 
necessity affecting the ship or cargo and the assumption of a maritime risk on the part of 
the lender of money. 
As regards the element of necessity, Lord Stowell in the case of The Nelson41 stated: 
'It is the state of unprovided necessity that alone supports these bonds - the absence 
of that necessity is their undoing.' . ~1 . 
Furthermore, as was pointed out by Dr Lushington the case of The Royal Arch42, the 
necessity relates both to the circumstances of the ship and the availability of finance or 
credit. The ship, cargo or adventure must be in a state of distress in the sense that 
circumstances must exist which represent a threat to the safety or good management of the 
ship or her cargo or to the successful completion of the enterprise on which the ship is 
'· embarked or to the continued use of the ship as a commercial instrument: it is the necessity 
39 The Atlas (op cit at 53); The Tobago (1804) 5 C Rob 218. 
40 Thompson v Royal Exchange Ass Co (1813) 1 M & SS 30 quoted in Thomas op cit at 211; The 
Emancipation (1840) 1 W Robb 124; Mackie,Dunn & Co v South British insurance Co (1885) 3 SC 405. 
41 (1823) 1 Hag Adm 169 at 175. 
42 (1857) Swab 269 at 282 quoted at Thomas op cit at 211. 
to incur expenditure that, in part, justifies the hypothecation. The necessity also relates to 
the finance; in particular, there must be no feasible alternative source of finance or credit 
---------·---····-----------·-------·---------·---- ·---- -· - -··-----------·------··· ----- ... --·-·-·---·-·------·---·-------- -·------- -- - -
other than the bond. It will be valid only when, in the circumstances of the particular case, 
a necessary expenditure can only be met by hypothecating the ship43. It must be an 
instrument of last resort. 
The second pre-requisite for a valid bond was that the lender on bottomry had, expressly or 
impliedly, to accept the risk of the voyage which the advance had facilitated. The 
entitlement to repayment depended on the 'safe completion of the specified voyage. In the 
event of the ship being lost the bond was defeated and the loss had to be borne by the 
lender44. 
If these pre-requisites could be established, the courts had admiralty jurisdiction over the 
claim and the maritime creditor enjoyed a maritime lien over the vessel to the value of the 
principal debt and the interest owed. It was considered contrary to common usage that 
bottomry liens should be left in abeyance long after termination of the bottomried voyage. 
The creditor was required to pursue remedy with diligence with the emphasis being aimed 
at preventing prejudice to others arising from purchase or accrual of subsequent liens45• 
The maritime lien existed independently of personal liability of the property owner. The 
~' lender had no personal remedy against the ship-owner, only a right in rem against the 
hypothecated property46. 
43 Thomas op cit at 219. 
44 Ibid at 220. 
45 Ibid at 213. 
46 The Royal Arch (op cit at 269). 
47 
The one feature that distinguishes the maritime lien on bottomry from other maritime liens 
is that it was clearly regarded as being transferable, with the transferee enjoying the same _ __ . _. _ 
·-- -·---·-·--··-·-··· -- --------··-- - --- ------·-- ·-- - -··· -·--··- -----·-·-· -------- --·· --
rights and privileges as the original bondholder47. The question of whether maritime liens 
are generally transferable, however, is a vexed one. 
Categories of property capable of being charged with a hypothecary lien are the ship, its 
freight and cargo48. When all three categories of property were hypothecated, the ship and 
freight were the first charge and only if they were inadequate to satisfy the claim could the 
lien on the cargo be invoked49. Particularly in the case of bottomry, and arising from the 
fact of the bond as an instance of express hypothecation, the precise categories of property 
charged are under the discretion of the parties to the agreement. The qualification that has 
to be added to that statement is that the cargo may only be hypothecated in this way if it 
also stands to benefit. In this regard, it is to be understood that, in hypothecating the cargo, 
the master acts primarily as the representative of the ship-owner and in the event of the 
lien over the cargo being enforced, the cargo owner apparently has a right of indemnity 
against the ship-owner5°. 
47 771e Eugenie (1873) LR 4 A & E 123 quoted at Thomas op cit at 213. 
47 Thomas op cit at 213. 
49 111e Dowthorpe (1843) 2 W Rob 73. 
50 Thomas op cit at 224. 
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3 Recognition of other categories of claims as giving rise to maritime liens 
Havinffdealt with thCestablishea' liens;Tfiemaiiis tOexainiiie two furtner areas in ·whfofi--
maritime liens may be recognised: the first is the group of maritime liens about whose 
existence there exists some doubt but which, according to Staniland1, were imported into 
South African admiralty law by virtue of the all-encompassing nature of s 6(1) of the Act. 
The second group is maritime liens recognised by foreign jurisdictions. 
3.1 'Uncertain' maritime liens 
As far as appears from the South African case law, the issue of whether to accord 
recognition to these 'uncertain' maritime liens has not arisen for determination by our 
courts. Staniland2 identifies a number of these maritime liens as including those for 
pilotage, loss of life, personal injury, and damage done by a ship in the form of pollution. 
Some of these have been dealt with in relation to the 'established' liens discussed. 
Hofmeyr' identifies the following 'implied' maritime liens in English law: life salvage4; fees 
and expenses of the receiver of wrecks5, and damage sustained by the owner or occupier of 
land used to facilitate the rendering of assistance to wreck6; and would, presumably, argue 
that these would be recognised by South African courts. 
Price 7 suggests that the claims of pilotage, towage on the high seas, and necessaries 
supplied on the high seas, which were claims which the Admiralty court had inherent 








'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 SAU 293. 
Ibid at 299-300. 
'South African Admiralty Jurisdiction' 1982Acta Juridica 30 at 40. 
Section 55 of the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act which re-enacted ss 458 and 459 of the 
United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 as extended bys 9 of the Admiralty Court Act of 
1861. ~ 
Section 567 of the United Kingdom Merchant Shippi-ng Act of 1894 which re-enacted s 455 of the 
United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 and provided that the receiver should, in respect of 
his fees and expenses, have the same rights and remedies as a salvor. 
Section 513 of the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 provided that such damage should 
be a charge on the maritime res and would be recoverable in the same manner as salvage. 
The Law of Maritime Liens (1940). 
Op cit at 16. 
49 · - · 
rather more equivocally, comments that there existed doubt as to whether the claims of 
towage and pilotage attracted maritime liens. He suggests that this d~1.:1~t_st~ms pi::_i_rp_arily __ _ 
--- ---------· ·-····· ----~-----------·-- -·-·---·-- . -- ----·-· - ···--··-···-·-··--·· -·- -~ - . - . ·····----· -·-··----·-
from the decision in The La Constancia9 in which the learned judge treated such claims as 
charges on the fund formed by the sale of the vessel in question, ranking equally with the 
wages maritime lien. Mansfield10 refers to a maritime lien in the case of towage and 
quotes as authority the case of The La Constancia. 
The common law relating to towage was reviewed in the case of Westrup v Great Yannouth 
Steam Carrying Co11 and it was concluded that a maritime lien did not exist in the case of 
towage. This was followed in The Ambatielos; The Ceplzalonia 12 which considered the The 
La Constancia to have been erroneous on this point. Thomas13 suggests that there is 
probably no maritime lien, only a statutory right in rem, and points as support for this 
proposition to The Henrich Bjorn 14. Price15 is emphatic in his view that the Westrup 
decision did not recognise a maritime lien in the case of towage. If these authors are 
correct in their contention, then South African admiralty law did not inherit such a 
maritime lien under the provisions of s 6(1) of the Act. 
The issue of whether pilotage claims are underpinned by the security of a maritime lien has 
not been conclusively determined. Thomas16 points to some early authorities which he says 
might reasonably be construed as furnishing support for the.,..existence of such a maritime 
lien. The question was left open in The Ambatielos; The Ceplzalonia. Thomas17 suggests 
the likelihood of a parallel between pilotage and towage and, on the basis then that he 
would ~:rgue that there is no maritime lien in the case of towage, would conclude that there 
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established it is unlikely, in the light of the reluctance in English law to extend the range of 
_ cl~ims_recognis~d ~- g!~ng_1:!s_e ~e> 111_aritip:ie_lj~_ns,_th~t such a maritime lien_will be added,_ 
and it is furthermore unlikely that such a maritime lien would be recognised in South 
African law. 
Opinion appeared to waiver on the issue of whether a claim for necessaries supplied 
attracted a maritime lien. Dr Lushington in the case of The Alexander Larsen 18, decided 
that there was no maritime lien in such instances, but in The Ella A Clarke19 he adopted the 
contrary view that the was such a maritime 'lien. Eventually, in a series of cases20, the issue 
was put beyond doubt and it is accepted that there is no maritime lien for necessaries 
supplied21. 
These then were the so-called 'doubtful' maritime liens, but, in addition, there were those 
maritime liens which, it was said, arose by implication from certain statutory enactments 
under English law. 
The first of these maritime liens is the lien in respect of life salvage. A claim for life 
salvage was recognised in terms of the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 189422, 
and although the point has not been decided specifically, it would seem by implication that 
a maritime lien may arise in respect of such claim. The practical relevance of this issue 
~' 
may be diminished considerably in South African law because s 300(1) of the South African 
Merchant Shipping Act expressly provides that where a salvor saves life from any ship 
within South African territorial waters or elsewhere from any South African ship the salvor 
shall have a lien over the ship. It is submitted that the lien referred to in this context is the 
common law possessory lien. 
18 (1841) 1 W Rob 288. 
19 (1863) B & L 32. 
20 The Pacific (1864) B & L 243 and The Troubadour (1866) LR 1 A & E 302 both affirmed in The Two 
Ellens (1871) LR 3 A & E 345, and 17ie Henrich Bjbm (1885) 10 PD 44, (1886) 11 App Cases 270. 
21 Price op cit al 54-5. 
22 Section 55 which was a re-enactment of ss 458 and 459 of the 1854 United Kingdom Merchant Shipping 
Act as extended by s 9 of the 1861 Admiralty Act. 
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The issue of whether such a maritime lien exists in English law would not be entirely 
irrelevant. Where the salvor, for some reason, had lost possession of th~ pr_QR~.rtY salved, or __ 
--·------- --------------------- ----·-·- -·- ---·. ------ -------·---------- ---· -- ----· - ------·· - - -
where, because the limitations on the lien recognised in South African law, a lien were to 
be asserted in respect of life salvage outside South African territorial waters and not 
involving a South African vessel, the courts would be called upon to determine whether 
under English law as at 1 November 1983, such a lien for lif~ salvage was recognised23. 
The second instance of such an implied maritime lien is that in respect of fees and expenses 
of a receiver of wreck. The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act24 confers on a 
receiver of wreck, on returning a wreck, or proceeds from the sale of the wreck to its lawful 
owner or other lawful claimant, the right to recompense for fees and expenses incurred in 
so doing. And, in respect of such claim that Act25 provided that the receiver should have, 
in addition to all other rights and remedies for the recovery of those fees an_d expenses, the 
same rights and remedies as a salvor had in respect of salvage due. This would, given the 
right of a salvor to a maritime lien, have given rise, by implication, to a maritime lien in 
respect of such fees26. 
In similar vein, s 568(1) of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act provided in respect of 
remuneration for services rendered by coastguards that officers and men of the coastguard 
were entitled to claim remuneration from the owners of shiµwrecked property, according to 
a prescribed tariff, and further, that the such remuneration 'shall be recoverable by the 
same means ... as fees received by receivers under this provisions of the part of the Act'. If 
then, as it.would appear, the receiver has a lien, so too would the coastguard. 
In English law, a maritime lien would also appear to be recognised by implication in 
respect of a claim for damage sustained by the owner or occupier of land used to facilitate 
' the rendering of assistance to wreck. The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act of 
23 Supra at 41. 
24 1894, ss 521; 523-5; 567(1). 
25 1894, ss 567(2) which re-enacted s 455 of the 1854 United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act. 
26 Price op cit at 2. 
189427 provided that such damage should be a charge on the maritime property and be 
recoverable in the same manner as salvage. On the same reasoning as applied in t~~-ca_s~ _ _____ ___ __ _ _ 
... -- --- - -- -- - -· --- ··-·· .. ,.. - ·-- --- --- - --· . - ------- --· -
of the receiver of wreck, this would appear to give such oJ.mer a maritime lien 28. The 
position in South African law is dealt with under the Merchant Shipping Act in terms of s 
295 which confers the power to pass over adjoining lands to assist a ship which is wrecked, 
stranded or in distress. 
In South Africa the position is governed by the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 
195129. In broad terms the relevant provisibns confer similar rights as those contained in 
the various English enactments to which reference has been made. 
Persons rendering assistance in the case of salvage or the recovery of wreck are entitled, in 
addition to reward for their salvage services, to recover expenses incurred and the 
provisions of the Act relating to the payment of salvage awards is to apply iri the case of 
payment of such expenses30. The Minister is furthermore empowered to detain the vessel 
involved and in some instances to sell it in order to recover the expenses relating to the 
recovery of wreck. Given the extensive powers of the Minister in this regard it is difficult to 
envisage a situation that would not fall to be dealt with under the provisions of the Act, and 
in which, therefore, the issue of whether a maritime lien existed would arise. Nevertheless, 
it would seem that since such maritime liens existed in English law by the time of the 
enactment of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, they must be considered as 
having been incorporated in South African admiralty law by the provisions of s 6( 1 ). 
3.2 Foreign maritime liens 
There remains for consideration the issue of whether recognition is to be accorded to 
foreign maritime liens. Recognition of such lien~~ould expand the number of classes 
maritime liens recognised under South African admiralty law. It has implications both for 
27 Section 513 which re-enacted s 446 of the 1854 United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act. 
28 Thomas op cit at 20, 77zc Mcm·c1 [1%3) P 247 at 254. 
29 Sections 301-4. 
30 Section 302. 
the instances in which the action in rem is available to maritime creditors and for the 
·- ranking __ ofdaims_among cg~p~ti_ng ~!~dit_qr~. __ 
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The problem of whether or not to accord recognition to foreign maritime liens has come 
before the courts on a ·number of occasions31. The question, succinctly put, is should the 
South African courts recognise foreign maritime liens in those instances in which the events 
giving rise to the foreign lien would not, if they had occurred within the South African 
court's jurisdiction be recognised as having given rise to a maritime lien? 
\ 
The answer to this question is not as elementary as it might seem at first glance. It is not 
resolved by reference to the principles of South African private international law which 
come into play where there is a foreign element in the dispute before a court, in particular 
where the domestic rules of the forum (lex Jori) and the relevant rules of the foreign 
country (lex causa) conflict. 
Since maritime liens were a head of jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty 
Act, 1890, and therefore, in terms of s 6(1), English law as at 1 November 1983 would be 
applicable, the question falls to be resolved by reference to English law. In other words, 
the South African courts have, in order to decide whether to grant recognition to a foreign 
maritime lien, to apply principles of English law, including the principles of English private 
~f 
internation~l rules, that are applied in deciding whether to recognise a foreign maritime 
liens. 
While the relevant principles of English conflict rules are clear, namely that where the 
rights involved in the dispute are procedural in nature the lex Jori applies. Where the rights 
are substantive the lex causa applies, the question of whether foreign maritime liens are to 
recognised by the English courts is far from clear~_The position in English law is to be 
gleaned from two decisions each of which, for differing reasons, is problematical. The first 
31 Orien/al Commercial and Shipping Co Ltd 1• MV Fidias (op cit): Transol Bunker BV 1· All' Andn·co Unity 
and Others: Grecian Mar SRL v MV Andrico Unity and Others 1987 (3) SA 794 (C); Brady-Hamilton 
Ste1•edore Co and Others 1· MV Kalantiao (op cit), and Transol Bunker EV 1• MV Andn·co Unity and 
Others: Grecian Mar SRL r /lfl/ Andrico Unity and Others 1989 (4) SA 325 (A). 
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is the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Colorado32. The position seems to be that the 
____________ ct.~~isj~~of the Court of._Appealin Th(!_ (olo,:ado,__if in_poi_Il1, ~puld be_binding Q.IlJb~_South .. ___ . __________ _ 
African courts, constituting, as it would, the highest authoritative statement as to the 
position in English law as at the relevant date, being 1 November 1983, the date of 
enactment of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act. The Court of Appeal would then 
be the highest court to have pronounced on the issue in English law and therefore its view 
would be regarded as reflecting the English law on the point at the relevant time. This 
would then be authoritatively binding on a,South African court in the exercise of its 
admiralty jurisdiction confronted with the same point. 
If it could be distinguished or was not conclusive of the issue, recourse would have to be 
had to the second decision which is a decision of the Privy Council in The Halcyon lsle33 in 
which the judges were split three to two in their decision. The decision in The Halcyon Isle, 
because it is a decision of the Privy Council, which stands outside the hierarchy of the 
English Court structure, is of persuasive value only. Its authority would then depend on its 
status as a court and the cogency of its reasoning. Its status is beyond issue but the cogency 
of the reasoning of the court, particularly one split three to two is open to question. 
The South African courts have on a number of occasions been forced to grapple with the 
problems raised by this question but the reasoning of those decisions and the debate which 
they have generated is now rather of academic interest only because the Appellate Division 
has resolved the issue, for the time being anyway34. 
The Appellate Division has authoritatively and unanimously decided that a claim is not to 
be recognised as giving rise to a maritime lien where the claim would not be classified as 
attracting a maritime lien if it had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of.the court. In 
""' other words, the lex Jon· must be applied to the recognition of foreign maritime liens. The 
effect of the decision is that where a cause of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction is 
32 I 1923] P 102. 
33 Bankers Tnist lntemational Ltd 1· Todd Shipyard Corporation: TIie Halcyon Isle I 1980] 3 AIIER 197. 
34 Transol Bunker BVv MV Andrico Unity, Grecian Mar SRL I' MV Andn·co Unity 1989 (4) SA 325 (A). 
recognised as giving rise to a maritime lien in that jurisdiction, a South African court in the 
exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction will not, in accordance with th_e t1_p_pr_qach)n_English __ 
----·-----·-··---·--··---·········--·-----· - --·-·-------------·· -- -- . -··· ·- -·------· -- -------- -----------· ·-- ---- - -- --
law, recognise that maritime lien if that cause of action, had it occurred within the 
jurisdiction of a South African court, would not have been recognised as having given rise 
to a maritime lien. 
The significance of the decisions on this point lies in the light they shed on the courts 
attitude to the nature of the maritime lien. But what is also of importance, in this regard, is 
that the range of maritime liens recognised'by the South African courts in the exercise of 
their admiralty jurisdiction will not include any recognised by foreign jurisdictions where 
those maritime liens are not familiar to the South African courts and this despite the 
compelling arguments against this somewhat parochial approach35. This approach of the 
South African courts is also in stark contrast to that increasingly adopted in other 
jurisdictions which is to regard the maritime lien as a substantive right and therefore 
governed by the proper law of the lien, in other words, determined by the law applicable to 
the facts giving rise to the lien. 
4 Recognition extended to other classes of maritime liens 
The maritime lien has been described as one of the 'most striking peculiarities of admiralty 
~' law, constituting a charge upon ships of a nature unknown alike to common law and 
equity'1. The importance of the maritime lien lies in the singular advantages it affords the -
maritime creditor whose claim is underpinned by the security of a maritime lien. 
Primarily. its advantage lies in the fact that it constitutes a basis for the enforcement of 
rights bv an action in rem and the value of that remedv in maritime law cannot be 
~ . . 
underestimated. Given the often considerable ditficulties encountered in identifying the 
35 See generally Staniland 'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 South African Law 
Journal 293; Staniland 'The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act and the Maritime Claim of a Saudi 
Arabian Necessaries Man' (1986) 103 South African Law Journal 350; Staniland 'The Halcyon Isle 
revisited: a South African perspective' 1989 (2) Llovd's Maritime and Commercial Law Ouartcrlv 174. 
Marsden 'Two Points of Admiralty Law' (1886) LOR 357 referred to in Price Law of Maritime Liens 
(1940). 
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owner of the vessel in respect of which any maritime claim arises; locating the whereabouts 
of that owner; serving the necessary notice of proceedings to be instituted for the 
-· ·--- - . ·-·- --- -- . ·- ---- --- -- -·--·-· - - - . - -- . --- ·-- --- -·-- --· ·-· ---- - ---- ---·-- ·-··-··- --·· -- - -
adjudication of the claim, and all this in the short duration of the vessel's sojourn in 
harbour, the option of proceeding against the vessel in the absence of the owner offers 
advantages which are all too evident. This option is one of the particular advantages 
afforded by a maritime lien2. 
The further important advantage of the security afforded by the maritime lien is that of the 
preference the lienee enjoys in the ranking'of claims against a limited fund formed by the 
proceeds of the sale of the vessel3. 
Given the fundamental importance and value of maritime liens, the parochial approach 
adopted by the Legislature and courts in restricting the maritime lien to the classes of 
maritime claims recognised as giving rise to maritime liens appears at odds with trends in 
other jurisdictions which have been inclined to extend the range of maritime liens 
recognised. Although it might be considered tempting to extend the number of maritime 
liens recognised, there are obstacles in the way of so doing. These may be considered as 
difficulties of principle and those of policy. 
When the established classes of maritime liens are scrutinised in an attempt to isolate 
~t 
general principles common to all, they are seen to arise and prevail in circumstances which, 
in some instances, are common to all, and, in others, common to groups of, maritime liens. 
All maritime liens are supported by considerations of policy. The mariners' wages lien is 
supported by policy considerations aimed at protecting what were perceived to be a 
particularly vulnerable group from exploitation; salvage by a concern to promote and 
encourage efforts directed at saving property an~_ife at sea; bottomr:1 by a concern to 
2 Section 3(4)(a) of the Act. 
3 Section 11(4)(c). 
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furnish support for commercial ventures, and the damage lien by consideration for the 
__________ enc_o_u~age~_~nt_of safe navigation4. ___ _ 
All maritime 'liens may arise in circumstances in which the party who bears personal 
liability may not be readily accessible to the claimant5. 
All, with the exception of the damage maritime lien, possess the common element of 
necessity; each arising from a service which may be essential to the successful completion 
of the maritime adventure. The maritime Fens for damage, salvage and bottomry have in 
common the feature of emergency in that each arises in circumstances which were 
unforeseen and which place the maritime venture at hazard. 
The extent to which the circumstances represented, in the emergence and the development 
of the law, underlying principles on which the existence of each of the maritime liens was 
dependent, is uncertain6. Each of the circumstances received different emphasis at 
different stages of the development of the law and it seems unlikely, the process of 
development of areas of the law by court decisions, that the linking circumstances in 
themselves possessed sufficient force to produce extensions of the categories of maritime 
liens, and that they now possess sufficient force to extend the presently established classes 
of maritime claim. 
While these common elements may be identified in an attempt to elicit some generally 
applicable principles that might be applied in extending the classes of maritime liens, there 
are equally elements which serve to distinguish the existing categories of maritime liens. 
Staniland7 identifies the following differences: each maritime lien developed historically on 
its own; each serves its own policy concerns; the requisites for the creation of the liens 
differs; the maritime liens are ranked differently;..they are not equally transferable: they 
encumber different property, and they are extinguished in different ways. These 
4 ·sec generally the discussion in Thomas op cit at 237-9. 
5 The Parlcment Beige (1880) 5 PD 197 at 218. 
6 Mansfield op cir at 392. 
7 'Should foreign maritime liens be recognised?' (1991) 108 SALi 293 at 294. 
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differences make it extremely difficult to make any generalisations about the origins and 
____ _recognition_ of dasse_s_9Lmc!rjt_irn_e lien_s, __________ ~------ __ _ 
With regard to the issue of whether personal liability on the part of the property owner was 
required to establish a maritime lien, Thomas8 has commented that in English law it has 
been obseIVed that a proper maritime lien must have its root in the personal liability of the 
owner. That statement, the author says, has partial accuracy but it is more doubtful 
whether it represents a general premise underpinning the entire law relating to maritime 
\ 
liens. It is indubitably so in English law that in relation to damage and disbursement liens 
the personal liability of the property owner is a pre-requisite to the availability of the 
maritime lien but this is not the case with all the maritime liens. The issue as to the 
relationship between a maritime lien and the personal liability of the property owner is one 
which falls to be answered differently as between the individual maritime liens. The fact 
that there exists this disparity may in turn be a symptom of the absence of any clearly 
defined theoretical framework in the development of the law relating to maritime liens9. 
A comparison of the existing liens suggests that the claims giving rise to those liens have 
few common characteristics and this may suggest that the admiralty courts adopted a 
pragmatic approach in recognising maritime liens, extending recognition to new categories 
of claim on an ad hoc basis prompted by necessity rather than a regard for a sound 
theoretical basis for the principle of so doing. 
In the way of any Legislative effort to extend the classes of maritime liens is, in addition to, 
the absence of any clear and consistent principles as to the basis on which recognition was 
extended to new categories of maritime lien in the past, a general reluctance, as a matter of 
policy, evident in the case law10, to extend recognition to new maritime liens . 
... _ 
8 Op cit at 15. 
9 Price Maritime Liens (194D). 
10 Transol Bunker BV v MV Andrico Unity and Others: Grecian Mar SRL 1· MVAndrico Uni(r and Others 
1987 (3) SA 794 (C); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co and Others I' MV Kalantiao (OJ) cit), and Tran.wt 
Bunker BV1· MV Andrico Unity and Others: Grecian Mar SRL I' MV Andn·co Unity and Others 1989 (4) 
SA 325 (A). 
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This reluctance is expressed by Marais J in the following terms: 
'While much is said about the nature and characteristics of maritime liens and the 
rights they c6nfer, no-consideration a.tall appears to have been given to what se-eins 
to me to be fundamental, namely that liens have direct and profound repercussions 
upon the claims of others who have had no part or say in their creation, that 
contemporary legal policy is chary of allowing parties to a transaction to create 
invisible and secret charges over property to secure payment of a debt, that where 
such charges are permitted to arise, It is because the particular legal system 
considers it to be consistent with its own notions of sound public policy, and that the 
predominating purpose and object of conferring a lien is to enhance the particular 
creditor's prospect of being paid when there is competition to be paid.'11 
In the face of such reluctance, its seems uQ_likely in the extreme, that either the courts or 
the Legislature will be persuaded to extend the classes of maritime lien recognised in South 
African admiralty law. 
11 Transol Bunker BV 1· /lfV Andrico Unity and Others: Grecian Mar SRL 1· MV Andrico Unity and Others 
1987 (3) SA 794 (C) at 820G-H. 
